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REPRESENTATIONAL RIGHTS OF SECURITY
GUARDS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT: THE NEED FOR A
BALANCING OF INTERESTS
I. Introduction
The private security industry is enjoying a period of great prosperity
and growth.' Particularly in large urban areas, there is a growing
belief that understaffed and overworked municipal police forces can-
not adequately respond to and deter crime. 2 Throughout the United
States, uniformed guards3 now patrol many locations, including
schools, banks, hospitals and apartment buildings, protecting both life
and property. 4 Residents of some urban areas even have found it
necessary to supplement the municipal police force. They have hired
private security companies to provide twenty-four hour vehicle patrols
of their neighborhoods. 5 In addition, the large casinos of Atlantic
City, New Jersey have created unprecedented job opportunities for
1. In 1976, the New York Times reported that private security services had
become a $12 billion industry, growing annually at an average rate of 10 to 15%.
Whelton, In Guards We Trust, N.Y. Times, Sept.19, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 20
[hereinafter cited as Whelton] (citing a survey conducted by Rand Corp.). On July
24, 1980, the Business Bulletin of the Wall Street Journal announced that the "[s]ilver
lining of the recession is apparent at private security firms." Wall St. J., July 24,
1980, § I, at 1, col. 7. The article quoted officials of private security companies who
stated that crime increases during a recession and companies are therefore more
security-conscious during economic declines. Id. The growth of the private security
industry has continued into the 1980's. Wysocki, Hired Guns, Wall St. J., Aug. 30,
1983, § I, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Wysocki].
2. Whelton, supra note 1, at 24; Gumpert, Civilian Cops, Wall St. J., May 2,
1977, § I, at 1, col. 1. See Herbers, Security Services Disarming Guards, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 21, 1981, at A22, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Herbers].
3. There is a debate within the industry over whether such guards should carry
weapons. Herbers, supra note 2, at A22, col. 3; Wysocki, supra note 1, at 1, col. 6. A
commission studied the private security industry in New York State and issued a
report in October 1983 recommending several changes in the way the industry is
regulated by the Department of State, including institution of mandatory firearms
training for all guards and periodic recertification for all pistol licenses. See TEMPO-
RARY COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF STATE, NEW YORK
STATE'S PRIVATE SECURITY GUARD INDUSTRY: THE NEED FOR REGULATORY REFORM 4
(1983) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. A full consideration of the report is
beyond the scope of this Note.
4. Cook, Brother Cunningham and the Guards, FORBES, Feb. 14, 1983, 107,
109 [hereinafter cited as Cook]; See Whelton, supra note 1, at 30.
5. Private Security Patrols on Rise in City's Middle-Class Areas, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 1983, at A50, col. 3.
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security guards.6 Accordingly, protective services is the third fastest
growing occupation in the United States.7 Some studies estimate that
over one million people earn their living in the private security indus-
try.8 This figure greatly exceeds the total number of public law en-
6. See Cook, supra note 4, at Ill (each casino employs approximately 200
guards). Cook's article details the Atlantic City union organizing efforts of Daniel
Cunningham, former president of Allied International Union of Security Guards &
Special Police (Allied) and its affiliate, the Federation of Special Police & Law
Enforcement Officers (Federation). Id. Cunningham recently was sentenced to five
years in prison for embezzlement, obstruction of justice and attempted bribery. 1982
Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 232.
In August 1983, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) dismissed a petition
for a union representation election at Harrah's Marina Hotel and Casino filed by
Casino Police and Security Officers, Local 2, a union set up by Cunningham to
organize Atlantic City security guards. Marina Assocs., 267 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 114
L.R.R.M. 1162 (1983). Section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
defines a labor organization as one "in which employees participate and which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976). In dismissing
the petition, the Board affirmed the finding of its Regional Director that the Federa-
tion and its affiliate, the Casino Police and Security Officers, did not qualify as labor
organizations within the meaning of the Act because they were not dedicated either
in whole or in part to the interests of employees as bona fide collective bargaining
representatives. Marina Assocs., 267 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 114 L.R.R.M. at 1163. A
consideration of issues involving section 2(5) of the Act is beyond the scope of this
Note.
In 1981, the Inspector General of the United States Department of Labor investi-
gated the conduct of two Atlantic City police officers who were subsequently in-
dicted for embezzling $12,000 in connection with organizing a local of the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Law Enforcement and Security Officers. 1981 Lab. Rel. Y.B.
(BNA) 349.
The State of New Jersey has attempted to control the infiltration of organized
crime into Atlantic City under its Casino Control Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-
63 to 12-75 (West Supp. 1983). The Casino Control Act provides for disqualification
of union officials convicted of certain crimes. Id. §§ 5:12-93(a),(b), 5:12-86(e)(4). In
Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709
F.2d 815, 831 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'g 536 F. Supp. 317 (D. N.J. 1982), the court held
that federal labor law preempted the application of the Casino Control Act to union
officials. The State of New Jersey filed an appeal, and the Supreme Court granted
review. Danziger v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local
54, 104 S. Ct. 479 (1983) (prob. juris. noted).
7. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. Between 1974 and 1979, the current
population survey conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census showed that
the number of persons employed as security guards increased by almost 100,000-
from 473,000 to 569,000. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HAND-
BOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 52 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS]. The Census Bureau conducts these surveys on a monthly basis for the
United States Department of Labor. Id. at 1.
8. Herbers, supra note 2, at A22, col. 5 (citing 1976 survey conducted by U.S.
Justice Dep't); Wysocki, supra note 1, at 1, col. 6 (citing recent survey conducted by
Hallcrest Systems, Inc., a McLean, Va., research firm, which found that 1.1 million
1984] GUARDS' RIGHTS 659
forcement employees." Notwithstanding the availability of job oppor-
tunities in the industry, there are numerous problems endemic to
employment as a security guard. Wages typically are low' 0 and risks
can be high, especially if the guard is armed.II Although union mem-
bership among security guards has increased, 12 collective bargaining
has been unsuccessful in alleviating the occupation's problems.' 3 This
persons are employed as security officers, a figure which is triple the 1969 total).
Some studies estimate that the number of persons employed as security guards is
closer to 600,000. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 1; HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 52; Whelton, supra note 1, at 21 (figures cited by
industry sources range from minimum of 500,000 to maximum of 1 million; by 1976,
100,000 persons were employed as watch guards in New York City, 15 times 1966
total).
9. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 1; Wysocki, supra note 1, at 1, col. 6.
10. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 38-39 (quoting witness who character-
ized industry's employees as "men and women who are not and cannot be paid much
more than the minimum wage"); Wysocki, supra note 1, at 1, col. 6 (wage rates are
typically four to five dollars per hour). The table reproduced below was prepared by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor and compares the
wages of guards and janitors in relationship to changes in the cost of living between
1967 and 1974.
Year Guards Janitors Percent Change
Median Percent Median Percent
Wage Rate Change Wage Rate Change CPI
1967 $2.05 - $2.14 - 4.0
1968 2.05 0 2.20 2.8 4.0
1969 2.08 1.4 2.34 6.4 6.0
1970 2.14 2.9 2.50 6.8 5.5
1971 2.19 2.3 2.70 8.0 4.6
1972 2.18 (.5) 2.78 3.0 3.4
1973 2.31 6.0 2.94 5.8 6.3
1974 2.33 1.0 3.13 6.5 11.1
Change
over 8 years 13.7 46.3 48.5
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources,
on Senate No. 1883 to Amend the Nat'l Lab. Rel. Act to Strengthen the Remedies and
Expedite the Procedures under such Act and Related Bills, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 574
(1977) (table IV appended to statement of Frank Baum, Exec. Vice-Pres. of Wallace
Security Agency, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
11. See Wysocki, supra note 1, at 16, col. 3 (discussing risks of improper use of
firearms and of "target" syndrome which result when guard is armed).
12. Cox, The Changing Guards, 15 LAB. L.J. 391, 391 (1964) (between 1954 and
1964, membership in major independent guard unions doubled). Between 1975 and
1980, membership in Allied and the Federation went from 700 or 800 to 6,000 or
7,000. Cook, supra note 4, at 110.
13. See Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 1300 (general organizer for Service
Employees International Union stated that competition in industry is "stiff, keeping
wages low even in collective bargaining settlements"). Due to high turnover in the
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failure of collective bargaining is an unsettling fact, given the stagger-
ing damages that could result from a major labor dispute in this
industry. 14
This Note explains and analyzes the unique provision of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (the Act) 15 that governs unionization of
guards, and proposes a consistent approach for the courts and the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board)", to follow in cases con-
industry, bargaining over wage rates is often emphasized, while bargaining over
benefits is neglected. Cook, supra note 4, at 110.
14. See Purolator Courier Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 599 (1981) (clients of Purolator
include all twelve districts of Federal Reserve System, banks, savings and loan
institutions and mortgage companies). Interruption of the operations of the large
national courier companies such as Wells Fargo, Purolator and Brink's could cripple
the country's financial system. In 1975, Pinkerton's and Burns International Security
Services, two firms which dominate the private security industry, reported revenues
of over $200 million and $181 million, respectively. Whelton, supra note 1, at 21.
15. The National Labor Relations Act consists of the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-67 (1976)), the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub.
L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-87 (1976)),
and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 164,
186-87 (1976)). The provision of the Act governing unionization of security guards is
section 9(b)(3), which reads:
§ 9(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
[Act], the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall
be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Pro-
vided, That the Board shall not. . . (3) decide that any unit is appropriate
for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any indi-
vidual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons
rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons
on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as
the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such
organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly
with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than
guards.
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976).
16. Section 3 of the Act provides for the appointment of a five-member Board. 29
U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976). The Board is empowered by section 10(a) to remedy unfair
labor practices as defined in section 8, id. §§ 160(a) and 158, and has further
authority to seek enforcement of its orders in the United States Court of Appeals. Id.
§ 160(e). The Board also is vested with broad power to decide whether there is a
question concerning the representation of employees affecting interstate commerce.
Id. § 159(c). Such powers are exercised upon the filing of a representation petition.
See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW
260-61 (9th Ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LABOR CASES] (discussing procedure in
representation cases). The Act provides for the delegation of certain of the Board's
powers to regional directors, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976) (representation cases) and to
a General Counsel. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976) (investigation of unfair labor practice
charges). The General Counsel supervises the regional directors and their field staffs.
[Vol. XII
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cerning security guards. The adoption of this approach should im-
prove the quality of collective bargaining in the industry by creating
greater stability in bargaining relationships.
II. Limits on the Board's Authority Set Forth in Section 9(b)(3) of
the Act
Section 9 of the Act grants the Board broad powers in processing
representation cases.17 Section 9(a) states: "Representatives designated
or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit .... ."18 In
section 9(b), the Board is given broad discretion to determine the
appropriate unit for collective bargaining, with a mandate to "assure
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by
this [Act] .... ."19 But security guards are accorded an unusual status
under the Act; "guard" is the only specific job classification men-
There are presently 33 regional offices throughout the United States. NLRB RULES &
REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE, SERIES 8, As AMENDED, § 203 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as RULES AND REGULATIONS]; 44 Fed. Reg. 34,215 (1979).
The Act does not provide for direct judicial review of Board decisions in represen-
tation cases. An employer who wishes to contest such a decision must refuse to
bargain, thus committing an unfair labor practice. The Board's order in the unfair
labor practice case is then reviewable in the court of appeals. LABOR CASES, supra, at
311.
17. Drivers Local No. 71, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB (Wells
Fargo Armored Servs. Corp.), 553 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1977), enforcing 221
N.L.R.B. 1240 (1975) ("[s]ection 9(c) of the Act confers upon the Board a wide
degree of discretion in determining whether a petition raises a 'question of represen-
tation' warranting the direction of a Board-conducted election") (footnote omitted).
Although section 9(c)(1) uses the term "question of representation,"see 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(1) (1976), the term "question concerning representation" also is used in the
cases and literature. For an example of such usage, see Office of the General Counsel,
National Labor Relations Board, An Outline of Law and Procedure in Representa-
tion Cases 26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Outline of Law and Procedure].
18. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
19. Id., § 159(b). Section 1 of the Act states the broad policies which the statu-
tory scheme is intended to promote:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to miti-
gate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protect-
ing the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choos-
ing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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tioned, 20 and it is governed by its own separate rules concerning
representation. 21
In contrast to the broad authority generally granted to the Board in
section 9, section 9(b)(3) specifically prevents the Board from finding
a unit appropriate if it includes both guards and nonguards. 22 The
section further states that "no labor organization shall be certified as
the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such
organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indi-
rectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees
other than guards." 23 This provision allows the Board to certify only a
"pure" guard union as a representative of guards. Guard unions which
are affiliated with nonguard unions may not be certified to represent a
unit of guards, 24 and nonguard unions may not be certified to repre-
sent a guard unit.25
20. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976). The Act also mentions the general category of
professional employees in sections 2(12) & 9(b)(1). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(12) &
159(b)(1) (1976).
21. The Act defines a guard as "any individual employed ...to enforce against
employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect
the safety of persons on the employer's premises . . . ." See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3)
(1976). The Board decides issues of guard status on a case-by-case basis; an exposition
of these cases is beyond the scope of this Note. For a compilation of such cases, see J.
FEERICK, H. BAER, & J. ARFA, NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS-LAW, PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 9.2.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FEERICK]; THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
424-26 (C. Morris ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as LABOR LAW 1983]. For a discussion
of the guard status of armored couriers, see infra note 52.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976).
Section 9(b) of the Act contains three subsections which limit the Board's broad
powers in processing representation cases. Section 9(b)(1) concerns professional em-
ployees, section 9(b)(2) concerns craft representation and section 9(b)(3) concerns
guards. Id. §§ 159(b)(1),(2),(3) (1976). Also, section 9(c)(5) directs that the Board's
appropriate unit determinations shall not be controlled by the extent to which
employees are organized. Id. § 159(c)(5). These are the only express statutory limita-
tions on the Board's powers in this area. Outline of Law and Procedure, supra note
17, at 130.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976). The test for deciding the question of
indirect affiliation is contained in Bally's Park Place, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 777 (1981),
where the Board stated that it would look to whether 'the extent and duration of
[the guard union's] dependence upon [the nonguard union],' or vice versa, 'indicates
a lack of freedom and independence in formulating its own policies and deciding its
own course of action."' Id., at 778 (quoting Magnavox Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113
(1952)). Cases applying this test are cited in Bally's, 257 N.L.R.B. at 778 nn. 6 & 7;
LABOR LAW 1983, supra note 21, at 424; and FEERICK, supra note 21, at 376.
24. Schenley Distilleries, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 468, 470 (1948) (petition filed by
guard union to represent unit of guards dismissed because guard union indirectly
affiliated with nonguard union); see also Mack Mfg., 107 N.L.R.B. 209, 212 (1953)
(Board revoked guard union's certification to represent unit of guards where affilia-
tion with nonguard union was discovered after issuance of certification).
25. Purolator Courier Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 599, 600 (1981) (courier/guards
found to be guards within meaning of Act; petition filed by nonguard union to
[Vol. XII
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The Wagner Act 26 contained no express provision relating to secur-
ity guards. In the Board's early decisions under the Wagner Act, it
refused to include plant guards in the same bargaining unit with
production and maintenance employees. 27 However, in cases such as
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ,28 the Board allowed guards to select
nonqualified unions as their collective bargaining representatives. 29
The Board found that Jones & Laughlin's refusal to bargain with a
nonqualified union which the Board certified as the representative of
a unit of its guards constituted an unfair labor practice. 30 The Sixth
Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order, reasoning that guards
who belong to a union representing plant employees would experience
conflicting loyalties in the event of a strike, since their obligation to
the employer would be incompatible with their obligation to the
striking union.3' The Supreme Court agreed with the Board's ap-
represent them dismissed as raising no question concerning representation); Wack-
enhut Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 398, 398 (1968) (petition filed by nonguard union for
unit of guards does not raise question concerning representation; participation of
guard union irrelevant). Both of these types of unions are referred to hereinafter as
"nonqualified unions."
26. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976)).
27. Phelps Dodge Copper Prods., 29 N.L.R.B. 988, 991 (1941) (parties wished to
exclude guards from unit; Board saw no reason to depart from their desires); Cox,
supra note 12, at 392; cf., Monsanto Chem. Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 789, 791 (1945)
(parties stipulated to unit including guards and nonguards).
28. 49 N.L.R.B. 390 (1943).
29. Id., at 392. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 426-27
(1947), enforcing 53 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1943), reversing 154 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1946)
(Board's brief to Court stated that it had certified bargaining representatives for units
of guards in more than 105 cases and that in more than 80 of these cases, certified
union also represented employees of same employer, albeit in different bargaining
unit).
30. Jones & Laughlin, 53 N.L.R.B. at 1046.
31. Jones & Laughlin, 154 F.2d at 935 (affirming its prior denial of enforcement,
146 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1944), after remand from Supreme Court, 325 U.S. 838
(1945)).
Executive Order No. 8972, dated Dec. 12, 1941, authorized the Secretary of War
to establish and maintain security at plants important to the war effort. NLRB v.
E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 406 (1947). Prior to the Board's original petition
for enforcement in Jones & Laughlin, the company's guards had been deputized as
auxiliary officers of the United States Army, a fact relied upon by the Court in
denying enforcement. See Jones & Laughlin, 146 F.2d at 722. The guards were
demilitarized in 1944. Atkins, 331 U.S. at 400-01. On the Board's petition for
certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment and remanded
for reconsideration in light of the alleged demilitarization of the guards. See 325 U.S.
at 838. On remand, the Sixth Circuit affirmed its prior denial of enforcement, noting
that the guards still retained "drastic police powers" over the production employees
and hence, it was improper for the Board to permit their organization by the same
union that represented the production employees. Jones & Laughlin, 154 F.2d at
934-35.
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proach and reinstated its order, 32 but Congress favored the Sixth
Circuit's reasoning.3 3 In the Taft-Hartley amendments,14 Congress
codified the Sixth Circuit's approach by adding section 9(b)(3) to the
Act. 35 The Board subsequently was prevented from finding mixed
guard/nonguard units appropriate, and nonqualified unions could not
be certified as the bargaining representatives of guards. 36
III. Questions About the Scope of Section 9(b)(3) and its Place in
the Overall Statutory Scheme
A literal reading of section 9(b)(3) reveals that it limits the Board's
unit determinations and prevents the Board from certifying certain
unions as the collective bargaining representatives for security guards.
But section 9(b)(3) is only one part of an overall statutory scheme
designed to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining and to assure employees full freedom of association and self-
organization.37 Section 7 of the Act guarantees to employees the right
to join or refrain from joining labor organizations.38 Section 8 pro-
hibits employers and unions from engaging in certain specified unfair
32. 331 U.S. 416, 431 (1947).
33. See 93 CoNG. REC. S6593 (June 5, 1947), reprinted in Legislative History of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 1541 (remarks of Senator Taft) [herein-
after cited as Legislative History].
34. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67)
(1976).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976). Section 9(b)(3) was the result of a compro-
mise between the House and the Senate. The House bill, as reported, excluded guards
from the coverage of the Act by defining them as supervisors. See Legislative History,
supra note 33, at 41. The Senate amendments to the House bill did not classify them
as supervisors. See S. 1126, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1947); Legisla-
tive History, supra, at 104. In conference, the Senate refused to accept the House's
exclusion of guards from the coverage of the Act, and a compromise emerged
whereby guards would be protected by the Act "only if they had a union separate and
apart from the union of the general employees." Legislative History, supra, at 1544
(remarks of Sen. Taft). The present language of section 9(b)(3) originated in the
Conference Report. H. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1947), Legisla-
tive History, supra, at 513.
36. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), quoted supra note 19.
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), which provides in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities ....
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labor practices.39 Section 9 gives the Board broad powers in processing
representation cases. 40
Section 9(b)(3) cannot be applied properly without considering the
Act's general policies and Congress' specific intention in passing this
section. 4' Viewed in this manner, the provision raises many questions.
Most of them arise from the enigmatic language of the section, which
narrowly directs the Board to refrain from certifying a nonqualified
union as the representative of a guard unit. 42 The clause does not state
to what extent, if any, nonqualified unions are permitted to partici-
pate in the Board's election processes. 43 Although early Board cases
established that a nonqualified union could not file a petition seeking
an election, 44 such unions have been permitted to appear on the
election ballot as intervenors if the petition was filed by a qualified
union or an individual employee. 45
Those who support the Board's present practice of allowing elec-
toral participation by nonqualified unions note that it fosters em-
39. Section 8(a) prohibits employer unfair labor practices and section 8(b) pro-
hibits union unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(b)(7) (1976). The Board's
powers with regard to unfair labor practices are described in supra note 16.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976). See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976). It is instructive to compare section 9(b)(3)
with the provisions of the repealed sections 9(f),(g) and (h) of the Act, which
contained similar language. These repealed sections had obligated labor organiza-
tions to file with the Board and the Secretary of Labor various documents assuring
that there was no Communist participation in the union, and barred any union
which had not filed such documents from access to the Board's representation and
unfair labor practice mechanisms. See Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 143, 145-46, 29
U.S.C. §§ 159(f),(g),(h) (Supp. IV 1952), repealed, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 525
(1959). Section 9(h) provided in part: "No investigation shall be made by the Board
of any question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees,
raised by a labor organization . . . , and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a
charge made by a labor organization . . . , unless [the union has filed the required
documents]." Id.
In UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956), the Supreme Court
considered how noncompliance with the filing provisions affected the status of a
labor organization. The Court read the language of the statute literally and con-
cluded that, while it prevented Board certification of such a union, it did not
preclude voluntary recognition of such a union. Id. at 73, 75.
43. This ambiguity initially was recognized and addressed in William J. Burns
Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 449, 452 (1962). See infra notes 88-91 and
accompanying text.
44. Schenley Distilleries, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 468, 470 (1948) (petition dismissed as
raising no question concerning representation).
45. See Rock-Hill-Uris, Inc. v. McLeod, 236 F. Supp. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
aJJ'd, 344 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1965) (petition filed by individual employee); BaUlly's,
257 N.L.R.B. at 778 (petition filed by qualified union). See infra notes 92-100 and
accompanying text.
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ployee free choice, 46 a paramount concern of the Act. 47 They read
section 9(b)(3) as limiting only the Board's certification powers and
refuse to imply that it limits guards in the exercise of their section 7
rights to select a collective bargaining representative. 48 The contrary
view is that section 9(b)(3) was intended to prevent access to the
Board's electoral process by nonqualified unions seeking to represent
guards.49 In view of the fact that section 9(b)(3) might be construed as
curtailing the freedom of choice of a particular class of employees, it
has been suggested that the scope of its application should be limited.
Proponents of this view would apply the provision only to "plant
guards" 50 employed by a company to protect its own property and
46. Bally's, 257 N.L.R.B. at 779. See infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 151, quoted supra note 19.
48. Bally's, 257 N.L.R.B. at 779. In the debates over passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act, Senator Taft emphasized that security guards retained their section 7 rights as
employees, notwithstanding section 9(b)(3). Legislative History, supra note 33, at
1541. The Board has taken note of this congressional intention in its decisions and
accordingly applies section 9(b)(3) in a narrow fashion. See White Superior Div.,
White Motor Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 1496, 1499 (1967), remanded, 404 F.2d 1100 (6th
Cir. 1968) (employer violated section 7 rights of its guard employees by discharging
them because they joined nonqualified union; court remanded to Board for reconsid-
eration of duration of Board order of reinstatement); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 167, 169 (1949) (Board rejected contention that section 9(b)(3)
requires application of different rules in deciding whether single or multi-plant unit
of guards was appropriate; usual criteria governing such determinations in other
types of units applied). Although the Act does not directly limit guards' section 7
rights to choose nonqualified unions to represent them, it does render such rights less
meaningful by depriving nonqualified unions of the benefits of a Board certification.
White, 404 F.2d at 1103, n. 5. For a discussion of the benefits of Board certification,
see infra note 108. It can be argued that any consequent diminution in guards' rights
is not imposed by the Board but rather is freely self-imposed by the guards when they
select the nonqualified union to represent them.
49. See Wackenhut Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. at 83 (1976). This view appears to rest
on a series of statements and logical inferences about the legislative intention behind
section 9(b)(3) and how it should be integrated into the statutory scheme. The
argument can be expressed as follows: Congress did not want guards to be repre-
sented by nonqualified unions and therefore prohibited the Board from certifying
nonqualified unions. Since certification is the end result of the Board's electoral
process, Congress also intended to deprive nonqualified unions of access to the
electoral process which leads to certification. Proponents of this view conclude that
by keeping nonqualified unions off the ballot, the Board is not disregarding employee
free choice. Rather, Congress limited this freedom by enacting section 9(b)(3). See,
e.g., Wackenhut, 223 N.L.R.B. at 83, discussed in fra in notes 101-06 and accompa-
nying text. See also Drivers Local Union 639, International Bhd. of Teamsters
(Dunbar Armored Express, Inc.), 211 N.L.R.B. 687, 689-90 (1974), discussed infra
at notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
50. The term "plant guard" is used throughout the legislative history. See, e.g.,
Legislative History, supra note 33, at 307, 362, 1544 & 1572.
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enforce rules against its own employees. 5 ' They would not apply
section 9(b)(3) to armored couriers, who transport property of em-
ployers other than their own, 52 or to guards employed by agencies
51. A principal proponent of this view is former Board member Betty Murphy.
In her concurring opinion in Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 236 N.L.R.B. 1196, 1197
(1978), she stated that the word "guard" applied only to an employer's own plant
protection employees, so that employees of a guard agency assigned to duty at
premises of other businesses could select any union as their representative, and the
Board would be permitted to certify it as such. Also see infra note 52, which sets forth
the concurring view of Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals. In American Dist. Tel. Co. (Los Angeles), 83 N.L.R.B. 517, 520
(1949), the Board held that section 9(b)(3) draws no distinction between plant guards
and guards employed by a guard service, and found the employer's operating depart-
ment employees to be guards. The Board later reversed itself and held that the
employer's operating department employees were not guards. American Dist. Tel.
Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1228, 1231-32 (1950). However, in Armored Motor Serv. Co.,
discussed infra at note 52, the Board reinstated the rule applied in American Dist.
Tel. Co. (Los Angeles). In Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 138 N.L.R.B. 449, 452
(1962), the Board reaffirmed the view that the Act does not distinguish between plant
and contract guards.
52. A prominent adherent to this view was Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court. In Drivers Local No. 71 v. NLRB (Wells Fargo Armored
Serv. Corp.), he noted that "[section] 9(b)(3) marks an extremely narrow exception to
the . . . Act's general policy of employee free choice." 553 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). According to Bazelon's
reading of the legislative history, Congress intended to ensure that employers had the
undivided loyalty of plant guards who were responsible for keeping order and
reporting the misconduct of employees. Id. He concluded that application of the
provision to armored couriers "goes far beyond that purpose." Id., at 1377-78 (foot-
note omitted).
Originally, the Board held that section 9(b)(3) did not apply to armored couriers.
Brink's, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1182, 1186 (1948). It reversed itself in Armored Motor
Serv. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1139, 1140 (1953), holding that although the danger of
divided loyalty was not as much of a factor with armored couriers as with plant
guards, it was nonetheless, present.
Since 1953, the Board has been urged on numerous occasions to overrule Armored
Motor. With court approval, it has refused to do so. See Drivers Local Union No. 71
(Wells Fargo), 221 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1242 (1975), enforced, 553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.
1977)(driver guards who transported money and other valuables found to be guards
within meaning of the Act); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 344 (Purolator
Security, Inc.), 228 N.L.R.B. 1379, 1381 (1977) enforced, 568 F.2d 12 (7th Cir.
1978)(driver guards who transported deposits, money, secur ities and personal prop-
erty found to be guards). See also Purolator Courier Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 599, 600
(1981)(couriers who transported time-sensitive commodities found to be guards);
MDS Courier Serv., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1320-21 (1980)(drivers who trans-
ported nonnegotiable instruments, bank deposits, bearer bonds and jewelry found to
be guards); Brink's, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1182, 1184 (1976)(couriers who delivered
nonnegotiable instruments to customer premises after closing hours found to be
guards); Drivers Local Union 639, International Bhd. of Teamsters (Dunbar Ar-
mored Express, Inc.), 211 N.L.R.B. 687, 689 (1974)(Board rejected contention that
couriers were merely "truckdrivers with guns" and found them to be guards).
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which contract with other companies to provide services. 53 Some
proponents of this view further contend that independent guard un-
ions have provided inferior representation to guards in contrast to the
representation provided by nonguard unions. 54 These concerns have
been addressed to Congress on more than one occasion. 55 If enacted
into law, these legislative proposals would end some of the debate over
the scope of section 9(b)(3) and allay the concern that its limiting
provisions are being applied too broadly. 56
53. See Wells Fargo, 236 N.L.R.B. at 1197 (Murphy, concurring); General Serv.
Employees Union Local No. 73 (Andy Frain, Inc.), 230 N.L.R.B. 351, 352 (1977)
(Murphy, dissenting). See supra note 51 for discussion of Wells Fargo.
54. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 578 (statement of Russell Silvers,
vice-president of Brink's, that guard unions are inferior because they have fewer
members, and these members receive lower wages and benefits than members of
nonqualified unions).
Many complex factors affect collective bargaining, including the size and strength
of the employer relative to the union, the degree of competition in the particular
industry, and the amount of government regulation. See generally LABOR CASES,
supra note 16, at 303, 484. However, all other factors being equal, it is difficult to
refute that there is greater bargaining power in numbers. Id. at 303. Thus, an
unaffiliated union can be seen as inherently inferior to a union which has forged
alliances, either formal or informal, with other unions.
Guard unions have been criticized further as being susceptible to corruption.
Cook, supra note 4, at 111. See sources cited, supra note 6. However, this charge also
has been raised against nonqualified labor organizations. 1981 Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA)
349 (noting indictments of Teamsters' officials).
55. In 1977 and 1978, Congress considered legislation to amend the Act. See
H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) and S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
Among other things, the legislation would have narrowed the application of section
9(b)(3) by preventing certification of a union as the representative of a guard unit
only if it admitted to membership nonguard employees of the same employer at the
same location, or was affiliated directly with a national or international union which
represented such employees. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management
Rels. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, H. Rep., 95th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R.
8410, To Amend the Nat'l Lab. Relations Act to Strengthen Remedies and Expedite
Procedures 7-8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (emphasis added). Al-
though the House passed its bill, the Senate referred its version back to committee. A
compromise could not be reached and the legislation never was enacted. FEERICK,
supra note 21, at 22-23.
Two bills recently were introduced in Congress to remove armored couriers and
contract guards from the coverage of section 9(b)(3) and to narrow its general
application. H.R. 2197, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 21, 1983), provides that "em-
ployees of employers engaged in the business of protecting and transporting the
property of their customers shall not be deemed to be guards." H.R. 2198, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (March 21, 1983), is identical to the legislation proposed by the
House in 1977, cited supra. Both bills were referred to the Comm. on Educ. and
Labor. CONGRESSIONAL INDEX, (CCH) 28,272.
56. A full consideration of the merits of this proposed legislation is beyond the
scope of this Note. It will be assumed that Congress intended armored couriers and
contract guards to be considered "guards" within the meaning of the Act, and hence
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However, the Board encounters further problems in guard cases.
One such problem arises from section 9(b)(3)'s failure to state how or
if it affects bargaining relationships voluntarily commenced by em-
ployers and nonqualified unions.57 This is a conspicuous omission in
view of the longstanding acknowledgement that unions may obtain
representational status without the use of the Board's election proc-
esses through voluntary recognition. 58 Historically, the Board em-
braced the view that Congress did not intend guards to be represented
by nonqualified unions at all, either through certification or voluntary
recognition. 59 The Board quickly reversed itself and held that section
9(b)(3) should be read literally as merely a narrow limitation on the
Board's powers of certification. 0 Thus, voluntary recognition enables
a nonqualified union to become the bargaining representative of se-
curity guards where section 9(b)(3) would not permit it to be certi-
fied 6l and also allows for collective bargaining in mixed guard/non-
guard units. 62
The Board protects voluntary bargaining relationships pursuant to
its mandate to promote industrial stability. 3 A voluntarily recognized
covered by section 9(b)(3). Clarification from Congress on the scope of this section
would, however, be helpful.
57. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of voluntary
recognition, see generally LABoR LAW 1983, supra note 21, at 488-549.
58. See Heider Mfg. Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1185-88 (1950) (during midst of
negotiations, employer questioned majority status of union it had voluntarily recog-
nized but did not file petition to test union's representative status; doubt of majority
status therefore was raised in bad faith); 17 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 159-60 (1952)
(representative status may be obtained through Board certification or other evidence
of majority status); 18 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 43 (1953) (majority status of union may
be proven by Board certification or authorization cards showing designation by
majority of employees). For a discussion of the difference between certification and
voluntary recognition based on authorization cards, see infra note 65.
59. Columbia-Southern Chem. Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1954). In Columbia,
a nonqualified union had been voluntarily recognized as the representative of the
employer's guards, and a collective bargaining agreement was in effect covering
those guards. Id. at 1189-90. The Board nonetheless directed that a decertification
election be held, rejecting the contention that the current contract barred the pro-
ceedings. Id. at 1191 and n. 6. For a discussion of the contract bar doctrine, see injra
notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
60. See Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 451, 453 (1961) (Board
held that in future it would not withhold application of normal contract bar rules
where contract covering unit of guards had been entered into after voluntary recog-
nition of nonqualified union, overruling Columbia-Southern, cited in supra note 59).
61. Burns, 134 N.L.R.B. at 453.
62. Wallace-Murray Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 1090, 1090 (1971)(petition to clarify
bargaining unit including both guards and nonguards dismissed; processing such
petition at mid-term of contract covering unit would disrupt parties' voluntarily
established bargaining relationship).
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), quoted in supra note 19; Amoco Oil Co., 221
N.L.R.B. 1104, 1105 & 1108 (1975) (employer ordered to cease and desist from
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union may apply for these protections by filing an unfair labor prac-
tice charge under section 8(a)(5),64 which makes it unlawful for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of its
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) .65 To date, the case
law under section 9(b)(3) has not established the circumstances under
which an employer may terminate a voluntary bargaining relation-
ship with a nonqualified union.66
refusing to bargain with nonqualified union it had voluntarily recognized for almost
40 years).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
65. Id. Section 9(a) specifies that a bargaining obligation accrues only when the
representative has been selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate
unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). A union can obtain representative status in any
of three ways:
(1) Generally, the appropriateness of the unit and the majority status of the union
is established in a Board representation proceeding, which begins with the filing of a
petition and culminates in an election and certification by the Board or its regional
director. 16 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 188 (1951). For the procedures governing represen-
tation elections, see generally NLRB CASE HANDLING MANUAL (Part Two), Represen-
tation Proceedings §§ 11300-11350 (March 1980 update) [hereinafter cited as REPRE-
SENTATION MANUAL]; RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 16, §§ 102.60-102.72.
(2) By providing proof of its majority status directly to the employer, a union may
obtain lawful representative status without the use of the Board's procedures. Even if
the unit later is found to be inappropriate, such recognition is lawful if the union is
the majority representative. See Wallace-Murray, 192 N.L.R.B. at 1090. However,
the employer takes a risk in according voluntary recognition. If the employer recog-
nizes a minority union, even by mistake, a violation of section 8(a)(2) of the Act is
committed. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976), construed in Bernhard-Altmann Texas
Corp, 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 (1959), enforced sub nona., ILGWU v. NLRB, 280
F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960), aff'd, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). At the time of the passage of
section 9(b)(3), an employer was not permitted to refuse a union's request for
recognition unless it doubted the union's majority status in good faith. See Joy Silk
Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264-65 (1949), enforced as modified, 185 F.2d 732
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). The Board subsequently aban-
doned this rule and held that the employer was permitted to refuse to voluntarily
recognize the union, so long as it did not commit serious contemporaneous unfair
labor practices. Thus, the union must petition for an election, if a fair one can be
held. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 600, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869
(1969).
(3) Finally, the union may establish its majority status and the appropriateness of
the unit in an unfair labor practice hearing. The Board then will order the employer
to bargain with the union. 18 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 43 (1953). The Board has held
that it has the authority to issue bargaining orders in unfair labor practice proceed-
ings without proof of the union's majority status, where the employer's unfair labor
practices erode the union's support and make a fair election impossible. See, e.g.,
United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1027-28, enforced as modi-
fied, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980), modified on remand, 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981).
But cf. Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), in which former Chairman Van de
Water & member Hunter, in separate dissenting opinions, argued that nonmajority
bargaining orders violate the principle of majority rule. Id. at 1195, 1198.
66. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
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Finally, once the Board has considered the limits of section 9(b)(3)
in relationship to its mandate to protect the section 7 rights of guards
and to encourage the preservation of voluntary bargaining relation-
ships, it has the further task of reconciling these interests with the
prohibitions on recognitional picketing, added to the Act by the Lan-
drum-Griffin amendments of 1959.67 Strikes and picketing frequently
have occurred in the security industry when employers have declined
to extend voluntary recognition to nonqualified unions. 68 In this situa-
tion, the union has few lawful options available for pressuring the
employer.69 Economic weapons such as strikes may be used lawfully
by a union that is the recognized or certified collective bargaining
representative, 70 and the Act specifically protects the employees' right
to strike. 71 However, section 8(b)(7) prohibits a union which has not
obtained Board certification from picketing or threatening to picket
an employer with the object of gaining recognition as the employees'
representative. 72 Recognitional picketing, regardless of its duration, is
outlawed where the employer lawfully has recognized another union
and the Board could not appropriately process a representation peti-
tion filed by a rival union, 73 or where a valid election has been
conducted by the Board within the preceding twelve months.7 4 Such
picketing also is unlawful if it is conducted for more than thirty days75
67. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 164, 186-87
(1976).
68. See infra notes 208, 214-41 and accompanying text.
69. White, 404 F.2d at 1103. In White, the Sixth Circuit noted that an employer
has the "unqualified right" to decline to recognize a nonqualified union; when it
refuses, "the union may press its case no further." Id.
70. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960) ("pres-
ence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the
parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have
recognized"); LABOR LAW 1983, supra note 21, at 995 ("collective bargaining, the
keystone of federal labor law, presupposes the availability to the parties of certain
economic weapons").
71. Section 13 of the Act provides: "Nothing in this [Act], except as specifically
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976).
73. See section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A) (1976).
74. See section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976).
75. The statutory language allows such picketing for "a reasonable period of time
not to exceed thirty days ...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). Where the picketing
is accompanied by acts of violence it may be found to be of unreasonable duration
where it is conducted for less than thirty days. See District 65, Retail Wholesale &
Dep't Store Union (Eastern Camera & Photo Corp.), 141 N.L.R.B. 991, 999 (1963);
LABOR LAW 1983, supra note 21, at 1096.
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without the filing of a petition for an election, and the Board may
direct an expedited election7" to determine the employees' sentiment.
Although Congress primarily intended this section to prevent recogni-
tional picketing by unions representing a small or nonexistent percent-
age of employees, 77 the Board has held that the statute's language also
proscribes such picketing by majority unions. 78
Under the Board's present practice of allowing nonqualified unions
to participate in its election processes notwithstanding their noncerti-
fiability,7 1 conflicts may arise. If the nonqualified union wins the
election, but the employer declines to accord voluntary recognition,
an argument can be made that picketing by the union should not be
proscribed by section 8(b)(7)(C), since the union has demonstrated its
majority status in an election.8" It is apparent that the drafters of the
Landrum-Griffin amendments did not conceive of such a situation
when they framed the language of section 8(b)(7)." This issue, and
others mentioned in the preceding discussion presently are being con-
sidered by the Board.8 2 The Board's well-reasoned treatment of these
issues, together with congrkssional clarification of the scope of section
9(b)(3), would have a salutary effect on collective bargaining in the
security industry.83
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). The statute provides that such an
election may be directed regardless of the Board's showing of interest requirement.
Id. The showing of interest requirement is discussed infra at note 84. For the
procedures followed in expedited elections, see RuIEs AND RECULATIONS, supra note
16, §§ 102.73-102.82.
77. See International Typographical Union, Local 285 (Chariton Press, Inc.),
130 N.L.R.B. 727, 733 (1961) (quoting extensively from provision's legislative his-
tory).
78. Id. at 727. A full consideration of case law tinder section 8(b)(7)(C) is beyond
the scope of this Note. For an excellent overview of the area, see LABOR LAW 1983,
supra note 21, at 1061-1107 (Chapter 23, Picketing for Organization and Recogni-
tion).
79. See infra text accompanying note 123.
80. See infra notes 236 & 240 and accompanying text.
81. See Drivers Local No. 71, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB (Wells
Fargo Armored Serv. Corp.), 553 F.2d 1368, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting
"puzzling issue" of relationship between sections 9(b)(3) and 8(b)(7)(C), and conclud-
ing that it resulted from "conceivable lapse in the draftsmens' attention") (footnote
omitted).
82. See infra sections IV, V and VI.
83. See generally, Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 568-69 (officer of security
agency argued that guards' inability to choose collective bargaining representative
with freedom they should have creates inequality of competition in security industry;
both employees and employers would benefit from better trained, more stable work
force that would result from consistent application of section 9(b)(3)).
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IV. The Board's Discretion to Allow Electoral Participation by
Nonqualified Unions
A union becomes certified by winning a Board-conducted elec-
tion. 84 Although section 9(b)(3) prevents certification of nonqualified
unions, it does not state whether such unions are allowed to partici-
pate in Board-conducted elections. In 1948, the Board established that
a petition filed by a nonqualified union for an election in a unit of
guards did not raise a question concerning representation and hence,
would be dismissed. 85 The Board has adhered to this rule, reasoning
that its resources should not be expended to resolve an alleged question
concerning representation raised by a union which cannot be certified
under the Act.86
However, filing a petition is not the only means of getting on the
ballot in a Board-conducted election. In certain circumstances, the
Board's procedures allow a union to intervene and "piggyback" onto
the ballot once a petition is filed by another labor organization.8 7 In
William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc. ,88 the em-
84. 29 U.S.C.§ 159(c)(1) provides in part:
Wherever a petition shall have been filed ... by an employee or group of
employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf
alleging that a substantial number of employees . . . wish to be repre-
sented for collective bargaining ... the Board shall investigate such peti-
tion and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representa-
tion affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing
upon due notice .... If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing
that such a question concerning representation exists, it shall direct an
election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
Id. "The Board has adopted the administrative rule that 30 per cent [of the employ-
ees] constitutes a 'substantial number.' " Outline of Law and Procedure, supra note
17, at 39. The rationale for the showing of interest requirement is that the Board
should not expend its time and resources conducting an election where less than a
substantial number of the employees are interested in unionization. See O.D. Jen-
nings & Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 516, 518 (1946). The showing of interest does not deter-
mine whether a question concerning representation exists. Sheffield Corp., 108
N.L.R.B. 349, 350 (1954).
85. Schenley Distilleries, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 468, 470 (1948).
86. See cases cited, supra note 25.
87. The procedures for intervention are described in REPRESENTATION MANUAL,
supra note 65, §§ 11022.1 to 11022.3. A union may be allowed to intervene if "it is
the certified or currently recognized bargaining agent of the employees involved,"
where it has a "currently effective or recently expired" contract covering the employ-
ees, or where it has provided the Board with cards signed by employees designating it
as their bargaining agent. Id. §§ 11022. 1(a), (b) & 11022.3. Although the intervening
union must submit cards from at least ten per cent of the unit employees in order to
participate fully in any representation hearing, it may obtain a place on the ballot by
submitting only one card. Id.
88. 138 N.L.R.B. 449 (1962).
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ployer voluntarily had recognized a nonqualified union as the repre-
sentative of its guard employees. A qualified labor organization subse-
quently filed a petition seeking to represent the guards.8 9 The Board
permitted the nonqualified union to intervene based on its contract
covering the employees ° and then faced the question of whether to
allow the nonqualified union to appear on the ballot, since it could
not be certified. The Board held that where a petition is filed by a
qualified union or individual employee, an intervening nonqualified
union could appear on the ballot, although a victory by the latter
would result in a certification of only the arithmetical results of the
election. 9 Since the nonqualified union already was functioning as
the unit's bargaining representative, industrial stability and employee
free choice favored allowing the union to appear on the ballot.
In Rock-Hill-Uris, Inc. v. McLeod,9 2 a district court expanded upon
the Board's Burns rule. In Rock-Hill, the petition was filed by an
individual employee seeking to be the bargaining representative of the
guards and watchmen employed at New York City's Hilton Hotel. 93
Two nonqualified unions were permitted to intervene in the proceed-
ing, although neither was the currently recognized representative of
the unit.9 4 The Director of the Board's regional office ordered an
election with all three alternatives on the ballot.95 The employer
attempted to enjoin the election, contending that the Board acted in
89. Id. at 450-51.
90. Id. at 449, n.3. In a prior case involving the same parties, the Board dis-
missed a petition filed during the mid-term of the incumbent nonqualified union's
contract, holding that the contract barred the processing of the petition. See Burns,
134 N.L.R.B. at 453. On the same subject matter, see supra note 59. However, a
petition may be filed while a contract is in force if it is filed during the "open period,"
sixty to ninety days prior to the expiration of the contract (ninety to 120 days in the
health care industry). See FEERICK, supra note 21, at § 6.5.3, 173-75 (explaining in
detail the "open period"). In the second Burns case, the petition appropriately was
filed ninety days before the expiration date of the contract, during the so-called
"open period." Burns, 138 N.L.R.B. at 451.
91. Id. at 452. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 N.L.R.B. 10 (1948), an individ-
ual employee filed a petition to decertify a nonqualified union which had been
certified as the representative of the employer's guards in 1945, prior to the enact-
ment of section 9(b)(3). Id. at 11. The Board directed an election with certification of
only the arithmetical results. Id. at 13, n.10. Westinghouse was one of the first cases
in which the board directed such an election.
92. 236 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd, 344 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1965).
93. 236 F. Supp. at 396. Section 9(c)(1) of the Act permits an individual to serve
as a collective bargaining representative. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1)(A),(B) (1976).
94. 236 F. Supp. at 397. The employer voluntarily had recognized one of the two
intervening unions as the representative of its watchmen, but the recognition agree-
ment did not extend to its guards. Id. at 398.
95. Id. at 397.
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contravention of section 9(b)(3) by allowing the two nonqualified
unions to participate. 96 The district court affirmed the Board's use of
its election machinery to obtain only arithmetical results. 97 The court
reasoned that section 9(b)(3) deprived nonqualified unions of the
benefits of certification without affecting the employees' freedom to
designate nonqualified unions as their representatives. 9 The court
found that the Board properly exercised its discretion in concluding
that an all-inclusive balloting was "a more reliable index of electoral
will than one limited to the sole qualified candidate." 9 Thus, the
Burns rule was applied to a case where the primary policy concern
was employee free choice.100
The Board adhered to the Rock-Hill decision until 1976. In Wack-
enhut,'°' a three-to-two decision, the Board criticized the reasoning in
Rock-Hill and held that it would be contrary to the purpose of section
9(b)(3) to allow a nonqualified union to appear on the ballot unless, as
in Burns, it was the incumbent bargaining representative of the facili-
ty's guards. 10 2 "Unqualified stranger labor organization[s]" were de-
nied a place on the ballot.' 0 3 The majority expressed concern that
Rock-Hill allowed any labor organization, including one with no
interest in representing the employees, to " 'jump' on the ballot" with
a minimum showing of interest.'0 4 The majority stated that it would
allow incumbent nonqualified unions to participate in the Board's
96. Id.
97. Id. at 398.
98. Id. The court compared section 9(b)(3) to the former sections 9(f) and (h) of
the Act, quoted in supra note 42, and cited UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351
U.S. 62, 74-75 (1956) in support of its conclusion that section 9(b)(3) did not foreclose
all representation by nonqualified unions. Rock-Hill, 236 F. Supp. at 398. See
discussion of Arkansas Oak Flooring, supra note 42.
99. See 236 F. Supp. at 398. In Rock-Hill, the Board distinguished Schenley,
where it had held that it would not expend its resources to resolve an alleged question
concerning representation raised by a union which could not be certified. Schenley
Distilleries, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 468, 470 (1948). Rock-Hill, 236 F. Supp. at 397, n.4.
The petition in Rock-Hill, in contrast, was filed by an individual qualified to be
certified as the statutory representative, so the Board's resources already would be
committed for the processing of the petition, notwithstanding the nonqualified un-
ions' participation. Id. The Board represented to the court that "no additional
resources need be expended to include on the ballot the names of disqualified candi-
dates." Id.
100. Preserving the stability of existing bargaining relationships was not a signifi-
cant factor in Rock-Hill, as it had been in Burns. See discussion of Burns, supra notes
88-91 and accompanying text.
101. 223 N.L.R.B. 83 (1976).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 84.
104. Id. at 83. Only one authorization card is required for intervenor status. The
requirements for intervention are set forth in supra note 87.
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election processes to avoid requiring the employees to "vote 'no' in
order to continue what they may believe has been a desirable existing
bargaining relationship.' ' 0 5 The majority cited this potential require-
ment as the only policy reason for allowing participation by nonquali-
fied unions in the Board's election processes.10 6
The dissenting members of the Board identified additional policy
issues.10 7 They expressed the view that section 9(b)(3) narrowly de-
prives a nonqualified union of the benefits of certification, 08 but does
not deprive guard employees of the right to choose a union to repre-
sent them. 09 The dissent criticized the majority for interpreting sec-
tion 9(b)(3) as a broad limitation on access to the Board's election
processes and argued that this broad construction impermissibly in-
fringed on the employees' rights "to express fully their wishes as to a
collective-bargaining representative." ' 10 The Board majority eventu-
ally adopted the view of the dissent in Bally's Park Place, Inc."'
105. 223 N.L.R.B. at 84. On a standard Board election ballot, voters are asked:
"Do you wish to be represented for purposes of collective bargaining by-[space for
name of petitioning union]." Yes and No squares appear on the ballot and the voters
are instructed: "mark an 'x' in the square of your choice." A sample of such a ballot is
reprinted in FEERICK, supra note 21, at 696 (Appendix F, NLRB Forms). Where more
than one union appears on the ballot, it states: "This ballot is to determine the
collective bargaining representative, if any, for the unit in which you are employed."
Instead of Yes and No squares, there is a box under the name of each union that
appears on the ballot as well as a box under the word "none," and voters are
instructed: "mark an 'x' in the square of your choice." Id. at 695.
106. 223 N.L.R.B. at 84.
107. Id. (Fanning and Jenkins, members, dissenting).
108. Id. The benefits of certification are listed and discussed in FEERICK, supra
note 21, at 115-18. One of the important advantages granted to certified unions is
protection of their bargaining status for one year from the date of certification. Id.
Under this "one year rule" an employer must bargain with the union in good faith for
at least one year, absent unusual circumstances. Id. at 115-16. In contrast, an
employer who extends voluntary recognition to a union is required to bargain only
for a "reasonable time," which may be less than a year. LABOR LAW 1983, supra note
21 at 541.
109. 223 N.L.R.B. at 84 (Fanning and Jenkins, members, dissenting). This point
was eloquently expressed by the Sixth Circuit:
It is true that the [union] could never be certified as bargaining agent for
the guards but this does not change the fact that the guards have a right
under § 7 of the Act to be members of the [union]. To hold otherwise
would attribute too much to certification. It would, in effect, be saying
that no labor organization has rights under the Act save a certified one.
Certification gives an organization which achieves it additional rights not
all its rights.
White Superior Div., White Motor Corp., 404 F.2d 1100, 1103 n.5 (6th Cir. 1968).
110. 223 N.L.R.B. at 84. Fanning and Jenkins objected to the majority's pejora-
tive use of the term 'stranger' labor organization" and noted that "an incumbent
union that has lost employee support may well be more a 'stranger' to employees than
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The Wackenhut, Rock-Hill and Burns holdings were reconciled by
the District of Columbia Circuit in Drivers Local No. 71, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB (Wells Fargo Armored
Serv. Corp.). 112 The Teamsters' local filed a petition for an election in
a guard unit, but the Board's regional director declined to direct an
election because the Teamsters admitted nonguard members. Hence,
the local could not be certified as the representative of the guards."13
The local then picketed the guards' employer. " 4 The Board found that
the picketing was unlawful and issued a cease and desist order against
the union. " 5 The circuit court enforced the Board's order and rejected
the union's contention that it had a right to a Board-conducted elec-
tion. " 6 The court emphasized the Board's broad discretion in process-
ing representation cases and noted that a Board-conducted election is
a "costly-occasion.""17 Under the circumstances, the Board could con-
clude that it would not be worthwhile to conduct an election with
only one nonqualified union on the ballot." 8 The court cited Burns,
Rock-Hill and Wackenhut as examples of how the Board's exercise of
discretion could lead to differing yet rationally consistent results.
Under these cases, the Board could place a nonqualified union on the
ballot where it was warranted by preservation of industrial stability or
other considerations."' However, the Board also had discretion to
refuse to place such a union on the ballot.120 The court thus avoided
adopting a general rule either granting or denying access to the
Board's election processes to nonqualified unions. Since neither the
language nor the legislative history of section 9(b)(3) provide guidance
on the question of access,' 2' the Board's interpretation of the policies
of the Act would decide the outcome in future cases.
an intervenor who, based on a proper showing of interest, seeks to appear on the
ballot." Id. The majority countered this criticism, noting that guards freely can urge
their employer to voluntarily recognize a nonqualified union as their representative.
Id.
111. 257 N.L.R.B. 777 (1981). See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
112. See 553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977), enforcing 221 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1975).
113. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1242.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1243. The picketing was found to be recognitional in nature and hence
violative of section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. Id. at 1242. See Section VI infra for a
discussion of section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act.
116. 553 F.2d at 1376, 1377.
117. Id. at 1376.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 449
(1962)).
120. 553 F.2d at 1376 n.27 (citing Wackenhut Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 83 (1976)).
121. 553 F.2d at 1374.
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The Board's most recent pronouncement may be found in Bally's
Park Place, Inc. ,122 which reversed Wackenhut. The Board adopted a
broad rule allowing all unions, qualified and nonqualified, incumbent
and nonincumbent, to appear on the ballot, provided the petition was
filed by a qualified union. Employee free choice was cited as the
paramount policy to be fostered by this rule.
23
The Board recently decided to review the Bally's rule. In Brink's,
Inc., 24 the acting director of the Board's regional office in New York
City ordered an election in a unit of the employer's guards and
armored couriers. 25 The petition had been filed by a qualified union.
Based on an adequate showing of interest, a Teamster local was
permitted to intervene and appear on the ballot. 26 The employer
requested the Board's review of the region's decision that the petition-
ing union was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.1
27
Although the Board denied the employer's request for review of the
issue decided by the region, it sua sponte granted review on, and
invited the parties to brief, the issue of whether the intervenor should
be allowed to appear on the ballot. 28 Therefore, the Board has the
122. 257 N.L.R.B. 777 (1981). The petition in Bally's requested that an election be
conducted by the Board in a unit of the employer's Atlantic City casino guards. Id. at
780. It was filed by Casino Police and Security Officers, Local 2, an affiliate of the
Federation of Special Police and Law Enforcement Officers. Id. at 777. After the
petition was filed, intervenor status was granted to Local 40-B, International Broth-
erhood of Law Enforcement and Security Officers, an affiliate of a New Jersey
Building Trades Council. Id. at 777, 778 n.8. The employer challenged the labor
organization status of both unions, but the Board rejected these arguments. The
employer also argued that both unions were affiliated with nonguard unions. While
the Board rejected this contention with respect to the petitioning union, it found that
the intervenor's affiliation with the Building Trades Council precluded it from being
certified as the representative of the guards. Id. at 777-79. Since the intervenor was
not an incumbent union, the Board thus was required to reconsider its decision in
Wackenhut.
123. Id. at 779. In accordance with prior cases, the Board also held that if the
nonqualified union won the election, the Board would certify only the arithmetical
results of the election. Id. at 780.
124. 2-RC-19536 June 14, 1983 (unpublished decision of Regional Director, Re-
gion 2, New York City).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Unpublished correspondence from Robert Volger, Deputy Executive Secre-
tary of the Board, dated July 13, 1983 (available in Fordham Univ. School of Law
Library) [hereinafter cited as Volger letter]. Section 102.67 of the Board's Rules and
Regulations provides for the filing of requests for review. See RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS, supra note 16, at § 102.67, 29 C.F.R. 102.67 (1983). The Board has discretion
to grant review where there are compelling reasons for reconsidering an important
Board rule or policy. LABOR CASES, supra note 16, at 309.
128. Volger letter, supra note 127.
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opportunity to reconsider the arguments for and against allowing
nonqualified unions to participate in its election processes. 129
As the District of Columbia Circuit stated in Drivers Local No. 71
v. NLRB (Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp.), the Board has discre-
tion to allow nonqualified unions to participate in its election proc-
esses. 130 The language of section 9(b)(3) does not prohibit such access
expressly, although an argument can be made that such a restriction is
implied.131 Since there is no direct support in the legislative history for
such a restriction, 32 however, the Board is on unstable ground if it
deprives nonqualified unions of access to its election procedures
merely by citing "the purpose of section 9(b)(3)," as it did in Wack-
enhut.133 Rather, the Board should consider the various policies and
interests in each case carefully and articulate why it is granting or
denying a nonqualified union the opportunity to participate in an
election. 34
129. The Board's determination of this issue cannot be predicted, since the only
current member who took part in prior decisions in this area is Member Zimmerman.
The Board presently is composed of four members: Zimmerman, who was appointed
in 1980; Hunter, who was appointed in 1981; Dotson, who was appointed as Chair-
man in March 1983; and Dennis, who was appointed in May 1983. Greenhouse,
Labor Board Stirs Up a Storm, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984, at D12 , cols. 2-6.
Zimmerman is the only one of the four who participated in Bally's, which was
decided by members Fanning, Jenkins and Zimmerman on August 14, 1981. Bally's,
257 N.L.R.B. at 777. Member Hunter, who was appointed to the Board effective
that same day, did not participate in Bally's, nor did former Chairman Van de
Water, whose appointment was effective as of August 18, 1981. See the listing of
members in Board volume 257, at page III.
130. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 49 and accompanying text, which sets forth such an argu-
ment.
132. The clearest insight into Congress' intent in passing section 9(b)(3) can be
obtained by reading the remarks of Sen. Taft. See Legislative History, supra note 33,
at 1544. The conferees made it clear that section 9(b)(3) was a limitation on the
Board's powers of certification, but did not elaborate on how such a bar affected
access to the Board's election procedures. Id. at 1541.
133. See Wackenhut, 223 N.L.R.B. at 83.
134. See generally, NLRB v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 724 F.2d 269 (2d Cir.
1983). In North Shore, the Board certified a union as the representative of the
employer's nurses. The employer refused to bargain, arguing that the union should
not have been certified because supervisors controlled its affairs. The Board rejected
the employer's argument and held that its refusal to bargain was unlawful. The court
of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order, noting that the case presented a
conflict between two policies of the Act. The policy of employee free choice con-
flicted with the policy of ensuring that employer agents do not improperly influence
collective bargaining on behalf of employees. The court found that the Board's
decision did not adequately address the conflict between these two policies, and
remanded to the Board to consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether to
disqualify the union. Id. at 273-74.
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When a petition for an election is filed, the Board must consider
several discrete interests. First, there is the overriding public interest
in resolving the question concerning representation and promoting the
Act's policies. 135 The Board is vested with the power to effectuate
these policies. 36 Second, there is the employees' interest in selecting a
collective bargaining representative.' 37 Third, there is the union's in-
terest in becoming the employees' representative.' 3 Although the un-
ion may obtain representation rights without using the Board's proc-
esses, 139 an election conducted by the Board can be advantageous.
Even where the union is nonqualified and hence cannot obtain a
certification after the election, the secret ballot conducted by the
Board gives it an opportunity to demonstrate its majority status to the
employer. A demonstration of such support might prompt the em-
ployer to grant voluntary recognition after the certification of
arithmetical results. Finally, there is the employer's interest in main-
taining the undivided loyalty of its guards. 40 Although the full scope
of section 9(b)(3)'s protection of the employer is unclear, it is certain
that by preventing Board certification of nonqualified unions, the
employer is given the right to refuse such a union's initial request for
recognition. '4 The Board has the difficult task of exercising its discre-
tion against this panoply of competing and sometimes conflicting
interests.
It is obvious that where an incumbent nonqualified union is in-
volved, certain factors favor allowing it to participate in an election.
135. See supra note 19.
136. See Container Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945) (in representation proceedings
involving contract bar issues, Board weighs two basic interests which the Act was
designed to foster and protect: society's interest in stability of industrial relations
achieved through collective bargaining and employees' interest in freedom to choose
bargaining representatives). Id. at 826.
137. The employees' right to select a collective bargaining representative is pro-
tected by section 7 of the Act. See supra note 38.
138. Once the union becomes the representative of the unit, the employer is under
an obligation to bargain with it. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). The union and the
employer may negotiate a clause in their collective bargaining agreement requiring
that employees join the union. Id. § 158(a) (3). The union has the right to prescribe its
own rules with respect to acquisition or retention of membership. Id. § 158(b)(1)(A).
However, the union has a fiduciary duty to the employees in the bargaining unit to
represent them fairly with regard to grievances and collective bargaining. See gener-
ally, LABOR CASES supra note 16, at 994-1054 (The Right to Fair Representation, Part
7, Subdiv. I).
139. See supra note 65, describing the ways in which a union may obtain represen-
tation rights.
140. The employer's interest in the loyalty of its guards is protected by section
9(b)(3). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 69.
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These include the public interest in maintaining the stability of the
bargaining relationship, the employees' membership in and familiar-
ity with the incumbent union, and the union's interest in continuing
as the representative. As far as the employer's interest is concerned,
the Board safely may assume that the employer would not have
recognized the incumbent nonqualified union voluntarily if such rep-
resentation divided the loyalty of its guards. 42 Thus, allowing the
nonqualified union to appear on the ballot advances almost all of the
interests the Board considers in applying the Act. This was the Board's
approach in Burns. 43
In contrast, allowing a nonincumbent, nonqualified union to ap-
pear on the ballot advances fewer interests and policies. The Board is
not facilitating the continuation of a stable bargaining relationship,
with its concomitant benefits to the parties and the public. However,
the Board is advancing other important interests. Allowing the non-
qualified union to appear on the ballot benefits the employees by
permitting them to choose among all the unions interested in repre-
senting them. 144 It also benefits the nonqualified union by giving it the
opportunity to demonstrate proof of majority status, which might
prompt the employer to grant voluntary recognition. 145 Allowing such
access does not significantly affect the employer's interest, since sec-
tion 9(b) (3) prevents the Board from certifying the union if it wins the
numerical vote. 46 Thus, the Board is not depriving the employer of its
right to refuse to recognize the union on an initial request for recogni-
tion. The only arguable detriment to the employer in the Bally's
election procedure is that it provides a victorious nonqualified union
with support when seeking voluntary recognition. 47 It can be argued
that it is improper for the Board to so assist the union in gaining
voluntary recognition. 48 However, if Congress considered this assist-
ance improper, it could have placed broader prohibitions on the
142. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text, which explain the concept of
"divided loyalty."
143. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
144. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 777, 779 (1981).
145. See supra note 65 and accompanying text, which explain that proof of
majority status is a prerequisite to the existence of a bargaining obligation.
146. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 65, which explains that majority status is one of the elements
that must be proven before the union can obtain lawful voluntary recognition.
148. This argument apparently relies on a broad interpretation of section 9(b)(3)
which would prohibit the Board from certifying or in any way assisting nonqualified
unions in obtaining recognition. Concerning Congress' ambiguity with respect to the
Board's election processes, see supra note 132.
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Board, as it did in sections 9(f) and (h),' 149 or precluded voluntary
recognition altogether. 150
The only other possible detrimental result of the Bally's election
procedure is that nonqualified unions can " 'jump' on the ballot"
without providing any substantial evidence of employee support.' 5' In
view of the Board's discretion in this area, it should consider requiring
that a nonqualified union which seeks to intervene present a full thirty
percent showing of interest. Adoption of such a rule would show true
concern for employee freedom of choice while preventing any per-
ceived abuse of the Board's election procedures. 5 2
In sum, the Board must consider the interests of the public, the
employees, the union and the employer carefully before it permits a
nonqualified union to appear on the ballot. If the Board decides to
retain the broad Bally's rule, it should provide a well reasoned ratio-
nale for doing so. However, as the Board noted in Wackenhut, the
nonqualified union need not rely solely on the Board's procedures to
149. See supra note 42.
150. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
151. Wackenhut, 223 N.L.R.B. at 83. The rationale for the Board's showing of
interest requirement is set forth supra at note 84. The requirements for intervention
are described supra at note 87. It should be noted that these are rules applied to the
broad class of cases before the Board and are not peculiar to guard cases.
The majority in Wackenhut did not elaborate on why it is more harmful to allow
intervenors to " 'jump' on the ballot" with only one authorization card in elections
involving guards than it is in other elections where guards are not involved. Perhaps
they were concerned with the possibility of collusion between an employer and a
nonqualified union to deprive guard employees of all representation. This could
occur where a nonqualified union obtains a place on the ballot by submitting only
one card, campaigns on the pretense that it wishes to represent the employees, wins
the election, and obtains only a certification of the arithmetical results. If the
employer and the nonqualified union have agreed in advance that the employer will
refuse to bargain after the certification of results, and the union then walks away
from the shop, the guards have been deprived of representation collusively, although
the very purpose of allowing the nonqualified union on the ballot was to ensure a full
range of choices to the employees. This type of collusion is more likely to occur in
guard cases, where the Board election can never result in the certification of the
intervening union, than in nonguard cases, where both the employer and the win-
ning union have an obligation to bargain with one another following the certifica-
tion. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1976).
152. See supra notes 101-11, 123. Adoption of this approach would avoid the
anomaly that, under the Board's present practices, a nonqualified union with only
one authorization card can get on the ballot as an intervenor, while a nonqualified
union with cards from thirty percent of the employees cannot get an election unless a
petition first is filed by a qualified union. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying
text. Opportunity to participate in the Board's election processes should result from
employee support, not from the fortuitous filing of a petition by another union. In
view of the unique nature of section 9(b)(3), the Board would be justified in making
this exception to its general rules regarding intervention.
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obtain recognition. 153 Thus, to fully understand the debate over the
Bally's rule, it is necessary to understand how section 9(b)(3) operates
in the context of a voluntary bargaining relationship between an
employer and a nonqualified union.
V. Voluntary Recognition of Nonqualified Unions in the Security
Industry: The Balance Between Section 9(b)(3) and Section 8(a)(5)
Voluntary recognition has been a significant factor in the security
industry for many years. 154 Yet, section 9(b)(3) does not state how, or
if, it affects bargaining relationships voluntarily commenced by em-
ployers and nonqualified unions.
The Board protects voluntary bargaining relationships pursuant to
its mandate to promote industrial stability. 5 5 A voluntarily recog-
nized union may apply for these protections by filing an unfair labor
practice charge under section 8(a)(5), which makes it unlawful for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of its
employees,156 if the representative can prove that it was selected by a
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. 157 Once
a bargaining relationship is established between a union and an em-
ployer, 58 various rights accrue from that relationship.
One right that accrues is expressed in the "contract-bar" doctrine.
Under this doctrine, the Board will dismiss a petition for an election in
a unit that is covered by an existing collective bargaining agree-
153. 223 N.L.R.B. at 84.
154. By 1953, the Teamsters had forty-two separate collective bargaining agree-
ments covering the guards employed by Brink's, Inc., notwithstanding the fact that
the union is nonqualified under the Act. Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 586
(prepared statement of Brink's, Inc., an armored courier company). In 1948, the
Board held that armored couriers were not covered by section 9(b)(3). In 1953, it
reversed this precedent. See supra note 52. As of 1977, Brink's had almost 5,000
employees, a large majority of whom were members of the Teamsters. Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 10, at 577 (remarks of Silvers). The Service Employees' International
Union, a similarly nonqualified union with 600,000 members nationwide, estimates
that at least 15,000 of its members are employed as guards. Id. at 1287 (prepared
statement of SEIU organizer John Geagan).
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (quoted supra at note 19). Amoco Oil Co., 221
N.L.R.B. 1104, 1108 (1975) discussed infra text accompanying notes 165-71.
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
157. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
158. The Sixth Circuit has found that the purpose of section 9(b)(3) prevents the
Board from ordering an employer to bargain with a nonqualified union when the
employer refuses to do so. See White, 404 F.2d at 1103. This section of the Note deals
with issues that arise after an employer has agreed to recognize the nonqualified
union and later seeks to terminate the relationship or fails to meet its bargaining
obligation in some other way.
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ment.' 59 The Board justifies the exclusion as stabilizing-the relation-
ship between employers and their employees' representatives for the
duration of a reasonable contract term.6 0 The Board has held that a
nonqualified union's collective bargaining agreement covering a
guard unit bars the processing of a qualified union's petition to repre-
sent the guards.' 6' The Board noted that the unit was appropriate
since it contained only guards and that the collective bargaining
agreement was completely lawful. Under these circumstances, the
Board did not consider certification to be a prerequisite for applying
its contract-bar rule. 6 2
Another right which flows from a collective bargaining relationship
is the right of both the union and the employer to select their own
bargaining representatives. 6 3 A corollary to this right requires that, in
the absence of exceptional circumstances, both the employer and the
union must deal with the representative chosen by the other party.16 4
159. LABOR LAW 1983, supra note 21, at 167. The doctrine is there described as
discretionary and self-imposed by the Board. Id.
160. American Dyewood Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 78, 80 (1952), discussed infra at note
162.
161. See Burns, 134 N.L.R.B. 451, 453 (1961), discussed supra at note 60.
162. Id. The issue is different in the case of a mixed guard/nonguard unit. In
American Dyewood, 99 N.L.R.B. at 78, the Board held that a collective bargaining
agreement covering a voluntarily established mixed unit of guards and nonguards
barred the processing of a petition seeking an election among only nonguards. Where
the petition sought to sever the guards from an existing voluntarily established mixed
unit, however, the Board did not apply its contract-bar rule. In Monsanto Chem.
Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 870 (1954), the Board distinguished American Dyewood by
reasoning that conducting an election among the guards, who were fewer in number
than the nonguards, did not disturb the stability of the bargaining relationship for
the bulk of the employees in the mixed unit. Id. at 871. In Fisher-New Center Co.,
170 N.L.R.B. 909 (1968), a collective bargaining agreement covering a voluntarily
established mixed unit was held not to bar a decertification election involving the
guard portion of the unit, although the Board's general rule is that a decertification
petition must be coexistent with the current contractual bargaining unit. Id. at 909-
10. The Board reasoned that if it applied its contract-bar rule and dismissed the
petition, it would be acknowledging the appropriateness of the mixed unit. Id. at
910. Another case involved a mixed unit of guards and nonguards employed by a
group of employers who bargained together, also known as a multi-employer unit. In
that case, the Board made an exception to its usual rule which gives controlling
weight to a history of bargaining on a multi-employer basis and conducted an
election limited to the guards of a single employer within that unit. Los Angeles
Bonaventure Hotel, 235 N.L.R.B. 96. 96 (1978).
163. General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969).
164. The court in General Electric discussed the type of exceptional circumstances
which justify an employer's refusal to deal with a chosen representative, and stated:
"There have been exceptions to the general rule that either side can choose its
bargaining representative freely, but they have been rare and confined to situations
so infected with ill-will, usually personal, or conflict of interest as to make good-faith
bargaining impractical." Id. at 517.
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In Amoco Oil Co., 6 5 the Board affirmed its position that the right to
select bargaining representatives is incident to a voluntary bargaining
relationship as well as to a certified one. In Amoco, a nonqualified
union represented both guards and nonguards of the employer in
separate bargaining units. Notwithstanding the existence of separate
units and collective bargaining agreements, the employees elected a
guard to a position that involved administration and negotiation of
both contracts.16 6 The employer refused to deal with the guard as the
union's chosen representative, arguing that its action was lawful be-
cause section 9(b)(3) required a complete separation of guards from
nonguards in collective bargaining. 167 The Board held that the em-
ployer's refusal to deal with the representative violated section
8(a) (5).168 The Board noted that the guards and nonguards were in
separate units and further observed that, although they both were
represented by the same nonqualified union, the employer voluntarily
agreed to extend recognition. 169 A factor which strongly influenced
the Amoco decision was the parties' bargaining relationship of almost
forty years. Once the parties have such a relationship, the Board
concluded, the employer cannot refuse to deal with the employees'
chosen representative "absent some statutory or legal impediment."'' 70
Without specifying what types of impediments would justify a refusal
to bargain, the Board concluded that none was present in Amoco,
implying that section 9(b)(3) does not constitute a statutory impedi-
ment to the continuation of an established bargaining relationship. 171
The Board recently addressed the issue of whether an employer who
voluntarily recognizes a nonqualified union in a unit of guards is
privileged to withdraw recognition under section 9(b) (3). * Less com-
165. 221 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1975).
166. Id. at 1105.
167. Id. at 1106.





On May 18, 1984, after this book first went to press, the Board issued its decision in
Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 116 L.R.R.M. 1129
(1984). The Administrative Law Judge's decision in Wells Fargo is discussed infra at
notes 174-204 and accompanying text. Contrary to the judge, the Board dismissed the
complaint against Wells Fargo and held that it was privileged to withdraw from its
voluntary collective bargaining relationship with a mixed guard-nonguard union at
the time it chose to do so (after the expiration of its collective bargaining agreement
with the union). 116 L.R.R.M. at 1132. On May 23, 1984, the union filed a petition
for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Local 807,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, No. 84-4083 (2d Cir. filed May 23, 1984).
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plex aspects of this problem have been raised in cases involving mixed
and therefore inappropriate guard/nonguard units, 17 2 as well as erro-
neously certified, nonqualified unions. 173 In contrast, Wells Fargo
Armored Service Corp. 174 involving a pure guard unit and a forty
year history of voluntary recognition, presents the Board with a novel
issue. In Wells Fargo, the Board has the difficult task of construing the
Congressional intent behind section 9(b)(3) in relationship to the
Board's established policy of preserving voluntary bargaining relation-
ships.
The charge in Wells Fargo arose out of collective bargaining negoti-
ations between the armored courier company and Local 807 of the
Teamsters, the representative of its employees.17 5 The parties were
unable to agree and a strike ensued. 17 Approximately six weeks into
the strike, after writing to its employees and unsuccessfully urging
them to accept the company's last offer at the bargaining table, 177
172. See Appleton Elec. Co., 93 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1976) (Advice Memorandum of
NLRB General Counsel) (section 8(a)(5) charge dismissed where unit was inappro-
priate); Barnard College, 5 N.L.R.B. ADVICE MEM. REP., 12,084 (1978) (section
8(a)(5) charge dismissed where unit was inappropriate; Division of Advice buttressed
this finding by noting that union was nonqualified).
173. See Mack Mfg., 107 N.L.R.B. 209, 212 (1953) (Board refused to issue bar-
gaining order and revoked union's certification to represent unit of guards where
affiliation with nonguard union was discovered after issuance of certification).
174. JD-98-82, slip op., New York, N.Y. (March 3, 1982).
175. In 1948, Local 820 of the Teamsters was certified as the collective bargaining
representative of the chauffeurs, custodians and guards in Wells Fargo's armored car
division in the New York City area. JD-98-82, at 2. The bargaining unit covered
employees working out of facilities in the New York metropolitan area, including
Westchester, Nassau, Suffolk, Orange, Putnam and Rockland Counties in New York,
and Essex, Bergen, Hudson, Passaic, Union and Morris Counties in New Jersey. At
the time of the certification, the Board's position was that armored couriers were not
guards within the meaning of the Act. See cases cited supra at note 52. Wells Fargo
and Local 820 subsequently entered into a series of contracts. In 1979, Local 820
merged into Local 807 of the Teamsters. Wells Fargo, JD-98-82, at 2. Wells Fargo
thereafter dealt with Local 807 as its employees' representative. JD-98-82, at 3.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 5. The letter to employees stated in part:
Collective bargaining between your Union and your Company began on
February 26, 1980, and . . . concluded on April 11, 1980. During the
course of these talks, the Company's representatives explained to the Un-
ion how, in the past, the condition of the business had so deteriorated that
the Company's New York branch had been losing money for several years.
These losses were due primarily to the ever-increasing number of non-
Union competitors entering the armored car business in New York. Be-
cause of this serious condition, it was necessary for the Company to ask the
Union and you to agree to changes in the contract . . . . We urge you,
therefore, to support your Company and your own future. Return to your
[Vol. XlI
GUARDS' RIGHTS
Wells Fargo withdrew recognition, 78 Local 807 filed unfair labor
practice charges, and a complaint was issued. 7 9 Wells Fargo stated
that it had withdrawn recognition after such a long bargaining history
because it believed that Local 807 was not as "security minded" as
Local 820.180 The company argued that its voluntary bargaining rela-
tionship with the Teamsters constituted bargaining at will-that it
retained the right to end its relationship with the union at any time.
The company also argued that the presence of an actual or potential
conflict of loyalties in its guard workforce should permit the with-
drawal of recognition.' 8 The administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected
these contentions and found a violation of section 8(a)(5), citing the
proposition that once an employer voluntarily has recognized a non-
qualified union, its refusal to continue to bargain may be in deroga-
tion of the employees' section 7 rights.18 2 Wells Fargo's "conflict of
interest" justification was rejected as pretextual by the ALJ because it
had been asserted for the first time at trial.18 3 To support his findings,
the judge noted that Wells Fargo had bargained with the union and
urged the employees to accept the previous bargaining offer prior to
withdrawing recognition. He concluded that recognition had been
withdrawn because the employees did not accept the last offer.184 He
added that, by dealing with the union and employees during negotia-
tions, Wells Fargo was estopped from withdrawing recognition. 8 5
Union officers and tell them you want to ... [accept] the Company's last
offer for a new labor contract.
Id.
178. Id. at 3.
179. Id. at 1. The complaint alleged that the withdrawal of recognition was
unlawful and that the strike was converted into an unfair labor practice strike as a
result of the withdrawal. Id.
180. Id. at 6. The employer witnesses claimed that they reached this conclusion
about Local 807 by comparing it to Local 820, whose membership was comprised
entirely of guards, whose representatives did not challenge the reasonableness of
Wells Fargo's security rules, and whose leaders had expressed a policy that they
would cross a picket line-all in contrast to Local 807. Id. at 6-8.
181. Id. at 2.
182. Id. at 12, 15 (citing White, 404 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1968) and Amoco, 221
N.L.R.B. 1104 (1975)). An employer violation of section 8(a)(5) is not solely in
derogation of the union's rights as bargaining representative. A violation of section
8(a)(5) or any other provision of section 8(a) has been held to violate section 8(a)(1)
derivatively, because it restrains and coerces employees in their right to be repre-
sented by a union of their choice. LABOR LAW 1983, supra note 21, at 75.
183. Wells Fargo, JD-98-82, at 18.
184. Id.
185. Id. The judge analogized section 9(b)(3) to section 9(b)(1), which prohibits
the Board from finding a mixed unit of professionals and nonprofessionals appropri-
ate without first conducting a self-determination election for the professionals. Id. at
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Both parties urged the adoption of a broad rule for application to
similar cases involving nonqualified unions," 6 but the judge declined
to adopt either proposal, carefully limiting his decision to the specific
facts of the case.18 7
A close analysis of the language of section 9(b)(3) reveals a dual
Congressional purpose behind the provision. The first portion of the
section deals with appropriate bargaining units; groups of employees
the Board finds to share a "community of interest."' 88 Congress stated
that guards have a loyalty to the employer which is not required of
other employees and expressly precluded the Board from placing them
in the same unit with other employees.' 89 Since proof of the existence
of an appropriate unit is a prerequisite to the issuance of a bargaining
order, 9 ' it seems reasonably clear that Congress did not intend to
allow the Board to issue bargaining orders in voluntarily established
mixed guard/nonguard units.''
15-17. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1)(1976). He cited ITT Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366 (3d
Cir. 1967), which affirmed the Board's finding of a violation where an employer
withdrew from a bargaining relationship covering a mixed professional/nonprofes-
sional unit. Wells Fargo, JD-98-82, at 16-17. Although the Board had erroneously
certified the unit without conducting the requisite election in ITT, the employer's
continued dealings with the union were found to constitute consent to the mixed
unit, and its subsequent refusal to deal with the union was found to be an unjustified
disruption of the bargaining process. ITT Corp., 382 F.2d at 370.
186. The employer argued that recognition could be withdrawn at anytime, or at
least when circumstances in the bargaining relationship established the potential for
conflicting loyalties in the guard unit. Wells Fargo, JD-98-82, at 2. In contrast, the
union and the Board's general counsel contended that the standard for lawful with-
drawal of recognition should be that which is applied in all other cases- good-faith
doubt of continued majority status. Id. at 19. This test was originated by the Board
in Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 671-73 (1951).
187. Wells Fargo, JD-98-82, at 19. Wells Fargo filed exceptions to the ALJ's
decision on April 26, 1982 and the Board presently is considering the case. Unpub-
lished correspondence from Joseph E. Moore, Assoc. Executive Secy. of the Board,
March 9, 1984 (available in Fordham Univ. School of Law Library). If the Board
reverses the ALJ and holds that an employer lawfully can withdraw recognition
under the circumstances presented by Wells Fargo, it can be argued that this holding
will extend the application of section 9(b)(3) beyond the intent of Congress, disre-
garding important policies behind the Act. See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying
text.
188. LABOR LAW 1983, supra note 21, at 201 (citing 15 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 39
(1950)).
189. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 65.
191. See supra notes 172 & 173. The Board's Division of Advice has stated that a
mixed guard/nonguard unit is "inappropriate for any purpose." Barnard College, 5
N.L.R.B. ADVICE MEM. REP. at 12,084 (June 1978) (citing, inter alia, Burns Int'l
Detective Agency, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961) and Fisher-New Center Co., 170
N.L.R.B. 909 (1968)). This statement is misleading, since a voluntarily established
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The second portion of section 9(b)(3) differs from the first in an
important way. Congress did not declare a guard unit to be inappro-
priate where its representative is a nonqualified union.19 2 Since such a
unit is appropriate, there seems to be no impediment to the issuance of
a bargaining order covering it, regardless of the union's identity. 93
Thus, the two portions of section 9(b)(3) are designed to address two
types of conflicting loyalties. The first portion deals with the inherent
and direct conflict that occurs where guards and nonguards employed
by the same employer are included in the same bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. 9 4 The second portion addresses the
indirect conflict that could occur where a nonqualified union repre-
sents guards. In the latter case, if the nonqualified union does not
represent the employer's nonguards, divided loyalty may not occur
among the employer's guards. 95 The absence of a provision prohibit-
ing voluntary recognition of nonqualified unions appears to reflect
collective bargaining agreement covering a mixed unit may, in certain circum-
stances, bar an election. See cases cited in supra notes 62 & 162.
192. Burns, 134 N.L.R.B. at 453.
193. Amoco, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1104.
194. See supra note 35.
195. To understand the concept of "divided loyalty" in both its direct and indirect
manifestations, a distinction should be made between plant guards and armored
couriers. Plant guards physically remain on the employer's premises. Congress pri-
marily was concerned that, if the plant guards belong to the union that represents the
employer's nonguards, the guards' loyalty to the employer might be threatened
directly by loyalty to the union in the event of a strike. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
Congress also was concerned that, if the guards belong to a union different from
that of the production employees, but the two unions are affiliated indirectly, a
conflict of loyalties might occur. See Legislative History, supra note 33, at 539-40. In
this case, the international union might have some common control over both the
guards and the nonguard employees, which could pressure the guards to honor the
picket line set up by the union of the nonguard employees. This type of conflicting
loyalty is also prevented by section 9(b)(3).
In contrast to plant guards, armored couriers do not perform their duties at a fixed
location. Yet, the Board has held that they are guards with respect to protection of
the property on their trucks. See supra note 52. If the courier endangers the property
on the truck by refusing to cross a picket line, this may be the type of divided loyalty
Congress sought to prevent. However, the problem only would be covered by section
9(b)(3) if the guard is a member of a nonqualified union and the picket line is
sponsored by a nonqualified union. Section 9(b)(3) fails to address the conflict that
occurs when a courier who is assigned to make a delivery to a plant where the guards
are on strike refuses to cross the picket line because he belongs to the same union as do
the guards at the plant. Yet this section arguably was created to prohibit this type of
divided loyalty. See House Hearings, supra note 55, at 491 (statement by Nat'l
Armored Car Ass'n and Indep. Armored Car Operators Ass'n). See also Bally's Park
Place, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 777, 779 n.12 (Zimmerman, member, concurring) ("[t]he
language of section 9(b)(3) is, in part, contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed
in its own legislative history").
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Congress' judgment that the employer should be left free to decide
whether there is potential for divided loyalties at the time a voluntary
bargaining relationship is entered into. 9 6
The Wells Fargo case illustrates the problems of integrating section
9(b)(3) into the overall statutory scheme. Congress allowed voluntary
recognition, but did not state whether such recognition could be
withdrawn if conflicting loyalties later develop during the bargaining
relationship. 197 Therefore, in the absence of express statutory or legis-
lative mandate, the Board should consider all the underlying policies
of the Act in deciding whether termination of voluntary bargaining
relationships between employers and nonqualified unions should be
governed by the same rules as are other cases, or whether the purpose
of section 9(b)(3) requires the fashioning of a different rule.
In Wells Fargo, both the union and the Board's General Counsel
argued that an employer who voluntarily recognizes a nonqualified
union should be permitted to withdraw recognition only if it has a
good-faith doubt of the union's majority status. 9 8 This approach pro-
motes industrial stability by preserving established bargaining rela-
tionships, thus advancing the underlying policies of the Act and pro-
tecting the interest of the employees and the union. 199 Under this
approach, the employer's interest in the undivided loyalty of its
guards is protected to the extent it is never compelled to extend de
novo recognition to a nonqualified union. 200 If the employer voluntar-
ily extends such recognition and a conflict of loyalties arises during the
bargaining relationship, the employer can only negotiate with the
union to obtain a collective bargaining agreement which minimizes
the conflict; it cannot escape from the bargaining obligation alto-
gether . 2 01
196. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. at 453.
197. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
198. Wells Fargo, JD-98-82, at 19.
199. See generally, Celanese, 95 N.L.R.B. at 671-73 (employer had reasonable
grounds to believe that union had lost its majority since its certification; no unlawful
refusal to bargain found).
200. Wells Fargo, JD-98-82, at 15.
201. See supra note 185. For example, the employer could negotiate for a broad
no-strike clause, or for a requirement that the union provide notice before initiating a
strike. The Board refused to adopt this approach in a case of initial recognition.
Local 639 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Dunbar Armored Express, Inc.), 211 N.L.R.B.
687 (1974) (Board rejects argument that conflict of loyalty could be resolved at
bargaining table). It is interesting to compare how the State of New York has
addressed the guard issue in its labor legislation. There is no prohibition on mixed
units of guards and nonguards. Employees have the absolute right to decide what
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In contrast, Wells Fargo argued that it should be able to withdraw
recognition at any time, or in the minimum, when it perceives a
potential conflict of loyalties.20 2 If adopted by the Board, this ap-
proach would advance the employer's interest in the undivided loyalty
of its guards. However, it also would destabilize bargaining relation-
ships to the detriment of the employees, the union and the public
interest. Such a rule would create a species of "at will" bargaining
foreign to the Act's general purpose of protecting lawfully obtained,
majority-based bargaining relationships. 0 3 Allowing withdrawal of
recognition under the circumstances presented in Wells Fargo would
penalize guards who exercise their section 7 rights to select a nonquali-
fied union and impose a disability on nonqualified unions without any
indication that Congress intended such a result.20 4
A. Recommendations for Legislative Change and
Consistency by the Board
Congress should clarify the statutory rule concerning the with-
drawal of voluntary recognition of nonqualified unions. A proviso
could be added to section 9(b)(3) stating that it should not be con-
strued to affect bargaining relationships voluntarily commenced by
employers and nonqualified unions. Alternatively, Congress could
prohibit voluntary recognition totally. If this clarification is not ob-
tained, the Board should consistently continue its present policy of
allowing withdrawal of recognition only when the employer has a
good-faith doubt of majority status.20 5 Application of the rule pro-
posed by Wells Fargo would constitute an unwarranted dilution of
guards' rights to enjoy the fruits of voluntary bargaining relationships
lawfully obtained by their chosen representatives.
union will represent them, and any conflicts are left for resolution by the parties at
the bargaining table. Yonkers Raceway Inc., New York State Lab. Rel. Bd., 63
L.R.R.M. 1098 (1966). The Board should consider applying such a test to the
withdrawal of voluntary recognition, since application of such a test would not
violate section 9(b)(3).
202. See supra text accompanying note 181.
203. See supra note 65.
204. See Amoco, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1104; see also Wells Fargo, JD-98-82, at 15
(citing MRA Assocs., Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 676, 677-78 (1979), where affiliation be-
tween guard and nonguard unions ended before withdrawal of voluntary recogni-
tion, affiliation did not provide defense to withdrawal; ALJ stated that to allow
withdrawal under circumstances would be an "unduly mechanistic" application of
law).
205. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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VI. The "Puzzling Issue": The Relationship between
Section 9(b)(3) and Section 8(b)(7)
Protection of lawfully obtained bargaining relationships is not the
only problem the Board faces in guard cases. The Board frequently
has been required to consider the "puzzling relationship ' '20 6 between
section 9(b)(3) and section 8(b)(7)(C), which outlaws picketing as a
means of obtaining recognition. 20 7 To obtain a full understanding of
collective bargaining issues in the security industry, it is necessary to
consider this body of case law.
In the mid-1970's, the Board and the courts decided a group of cases
in which nonqualified unions picketed employers to obtain recogni-
tion as the representatives of guard employees. 208 The impetus for
these cases is found in Teamsters Local Union No. 115 (Vila-Barr
Co.). 20 9 Although Vila-Barr did not involve guards, it involved a unit
composed of only one employee, a so-called "one-man unit." The
union in Vila-Barr picketed to obtain recognition as the representative
of this unit. 210 Such picketing generally would violate section
8(b)(7)(C) unless the union filed a petition for an election within a
reasonable time. 211 Under established law, however, the Board does
not direct an election in a "one-man unit. '21 2 The Board in Vila-Barr
thus was presented with the question of whether such picketing vio-
lated section 8(b)(7)(C) where it was futile for the union to file a
petition for an election, since it never could be certified as the repre-
sentative of the "one-man unit." The Board held that the union
essentially could picket forever to obtain recognition in a "one-man
unit," since it was prevented "for reasons beyond its control" from
206. See supra note 81.
207. See supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
208. These cases often involved attempts by the Teamsters to organize the employ-
ees of armored courier companies. See infra notes 214-25 and accompanying text. In
these cases, unions frequently argued that armored couriers were not guards within
the meaning of the Act. The argument always was rejected by the Board majority.
See cases cited supra at notes 51 & 52. The argument eventually was addressed to
Congress. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. The cases discussed in
Section VI of this Note were commented upon in the congressional hearings on the
Labor Reform Act of 1977. See House Hearings, supra note 55, at 491 (statement by
Nat'l Armored Car Ass'n and Indep. Armored Car Operators Ass'n).
209. 157 N.L.R.B. 588 (1966).
210. Id. at 588.
211. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
212. See Al & Dick's Steak House, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 1207 (1961) (petition for
expedited election in one-man unit dismissed; Board expressed no view as to whether
picketing violated section 8(b)(7)(C)).
[Vol. XII
GUARDS' RIGHTS
being certified as the unit representative. 213 Vila-Barr may be analo-
gized to the situation under section 9(b)(3), where a nonqualified
union may not be certified as the representative of a unit of guards.
Several years later, another Teamsters local argued by analogy to
Vila-Barr when it was charged with picketing to obtain recognition in
a unit of guards in Drivers Local Union 639, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters (Dunbar Armored Express Inc.). 214 Before it pick-
eted, the union filed a petition for an election in the guard unit. The
union withdrew its petition after being advised by the Board's re-
gional office that the petition would be dismissed. 215 The Board
agreed that the union was unable to obtain certification for a guard
unit. However, the Board distinguished the facts in Dunbar from
those in Vila-Barr and found the union's picketing violative of section
8(b)(7)(C). In Vila-Barr, the Board noted, the union was prevented
from representing the unit because of the Board's policy of not con-
ducting elections in "one-man units," whereas the union in Dunbar
was prevented from representing guards by its voluntary practice of
admitting nonguards to membership. 21 6 Also, the employees in Dun-
bar were free to seek certification of a guard union as their representa-
tive through the Board's processes, without resort to recognitional
picketing, whereas the one employee in Vila-Barr had no means of
obtaining any form of representation if the union was not permitted to
picket. 217 In sum, the Board held that dismissal of a union petition was
no defense to the section 8(b)(7)(C) charge.2 1 8
A year later, the interface between sections 9(b)(3) and 8(b)(7) was
considered again in Drivers Local No. 71 v. NLRB (Wells Fargo
Armored Serv. Corp.). 219 The petition there was filed by a nonquali-
fied Teamster local to represent a unit of guards and predictably was
dismissed. 22 0 The union's subsequent picketing was found violative of
213. 157 N.L.R.B. at 590-91.
214. 211 N.L.R.B. 687 (1974).
215. Id. at 688. After the union had been enjoined from picketing, it filed a second
petition which was dismissed. Id. The union argued that it had not violated the Act,
because it had filed a petition for an election as required by section 8(b)(7)(C). Id. at
689.
216. Id. at 690.
217. Id.
218. Id. The Board noted that sections 8(b)(7)(A) and (B) preclude picketing
where a question concerning representation cannot be raised. Id. See supra notes 73-
74 and accompanying text. By analogy, section 8(b)(7)(C) was also considered to
prohibit picketing where the petition did not raise a valid question concerning
representation. 211 N.L.R.B. at 690.
219. 553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977), enforcing 221 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1975).
220. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1243. The petition did not raise a question concerning
representation since the union could not be certified to represent a unit of guards. See
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section 8(b)(7)(C) under Dunbar.22' The District of Columbia Circuit
enforced the Board's decision after considering the union's contention
that, despite the statutory prohibition against the union's certifica-
tion, the Board should have conducted an election. 222 The fallacy in
the union's reasoning, according to the court, was its belief that it had
a right to a Board-conducted election with a certification of arithmeti-
cal results. Under Burns, Rock-Hill, and Wackenhut, the court rea-
soned, the Board may exercise its discretion to place a nonqualified
union on the ballot where preservation of industrial stability or other
considerations warrant its doing so. However, the court concluded the
Board also has discretion to refuse to place such a union on the
ballot. 223
In subsequent cases, the Board and the courts have reaffirmed the
principle that recognitional picketing by a nonqualified union violates
section 8(b)(7)(C). 22 4 The District of Columbia Circuit considered the
supra notes 24 & 85. Member Fanning dissented. He noted that section 8(b)(7)(C)
requires the Board to conduct an expedited election without regard to the provisions
of section 9(c)(1). 221 N.L.R.B. at 1240. One of the requirements of section 9(c)(1) is
that a question concerning representation must exist. See supra note 84 for text of this
section. Thus, Fanning argued it was irrelevant that the petition raised no question
concerning representation. It was his view that the Board should have conducted the
election anyway. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1241 (Fanning, member, dissenting).
221. Id.
222. 553 F.2d at 1376-77.
223. Id. at 1376. The court expressly rejected the reasoning in Fanning's dissent
concerning the provision for expedited elections without regard to section 9(c)(1). See
supra note 220. The court noted that the language was not intended to deprive the
Board of its discretion to decide whether the petition raises a question concerning
representation, but was intended to dispense with pre-election hearings in the case of
expedited elections. In support of this interpretation, the court cited International
Hod Carriers Union of America, Local 840 (Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153
(1962). Driver's Local 71 (Wells Fargo), 553 F.2d at 1376 n.30. The court concluded
that the Board had discretion to dismiss the petition and that any subsequent picket-
ing by the union was violative of section 8(b)(7)(C). Id. at 1377. Otherwise, it
reasoned, nonqualified unions would be afforded the unlimited right to picket for
recognition, thus achieving greater rights than qualified unions which are capable of
being certified as the representative of the employees. Id.
224. See Local 282, International Bhd. of Teamsters (General Contractors Ass'n of
New York, Inc.), 262 N.L.R.B. 528 (1982)(Teamsters demanded that its members be
hired as armed guards at construction site; Board reversed ALJ's finding that individ-
uals were not guards and found that subsequent picketing was recognitional in
nature); General Serv. Employees Union Local No. 73 (Mack Leonard), 239
N.L.R.B. 1233 (1979) (also finding, inter alia, violation of section 8(b)(7)(A) because
employer had recognized another union at time of picketing); International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 344 (Purolator Security, Inc.), 228 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1977), en-
forced, 568 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978) (Board rejected contention that armored couriers
are not guards and found that picketing had unlawful recognitional object); General
Serv. Employees Union Local No. 73 (Andy Frain, Inc.), 230 N.L.R.B. 351 (1977)
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issue again in General Service Employees Union Local 73 (A-1 Secur-
ity Serv. Co.), 225 where it expanded on its reasoning in Drivers Local
71 (Wells Fargo). In A-i, the union argued that it was entitled to an
election and a certification of arithmetical results, although it had not
filed a petition. 226 The court addressed this argument by stating:
"when the characteristics of a union conclusively preclude it from
becoming a certified representative, the Board in its discretion may
consider an 8(b)(7)(C) petition by such a union a nullity on its
face. ' 227 The court found that section 8(b)(7)(C) appears to contem-
plate picketing "by way of prelude to an election" 28 and concluded
that "where a party is disqualified from winning an election as certi-
fied bargaining representative, he cannot make use of the procedures
that are intended to lead to that result. 229
Presently, the Board is considering a section 8(b)(7) case that illus-
trates the ramifications of the Bally's election procedure. In Local
Union No. 803, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hospital Center),230 a nonqualified union that easily won a
Bally's election in a unit of hospital guards threatened to picket after
the employer refused to bargain. 23' The union argued that section
8(b)(7) was not meant to outlaw picketing by a union that had dem-
(Board rejected contention that contract guards are not covered by section 9(b)(3);
picketing for recognition in such unit held unlawful).
225. 578 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1978), enforcing 224 N.L.R.B. 434 (1976).
226. 578 F.2d at 371.
227. Id. (emphasis added).
228. Id. (quoting its earlier opinion in Drivers Local 71 (Wells Fargo), 553 F.2d at
1377).
229. 578 F.2d at 371. In A-1, no picketing ever occurred. Id. at 365. However, the
language of section 8(b)(7) also prohibits threats to picket. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)
(1976). The court held that where a nonqualified union threatens to picket, it violates
section 8(b)(7)(C) immediately; since it can never be certified as the representative, it
cannot take advantage of the reasonable time grace period (up to thirty days)
provided for recognitional picketing in section 8(b)(7)(C). A-1, 578 F.2d at 370.
230. JD-115-83, slip op., New York, N.Y. (Sept. 29, 1983).
231. Id. at 3-4. The petition in St. Luke's was filed by a guard union, and the
Teamsters local was permitted on the ballot pursuant to the Bally's rule, although it
was not an incumbent labor organization. Another guard union was also permitted
to intervene and appear on the ballot. The results of the election were: of 33 eligible
voters, 22 votes were cast for the Teamsters, 7 votes were cast for "no union," and no
votes were cast for either'of the two guard unions. Id. at 3. The lack of election
support for the petitioning guard union is curious, since a petitioner must demon-
strate at least a thirty percent showing of interest in support of its petition. See supra
note 84.
The union's threat to picket was enjoined while unfair labor practice charges were
pending. Silverman v. Local No. 803, International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 83-2095,
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1983).
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onstrated its majority status in an election. 232 The ALJ rejected this
argument, finding a violation of section 8(b)(7)(B) under the clear
language of the statute, since a valid election had been held in the past
twelve months. 233 The judge concluded that it was immaterial that
the union had won the election. Since the union could not be certified,
either a threat to picket or picketing of any duration violated section
8(b)(7) (C) .234
The union filed exceptions to the judge's decision in St. Luke's, and
the Board presently is considering the case. 35 The union's argument
has superficial appeal. It won a Board election, and the employer
refused to bargain. Since section 9(b)(3) prevents the union from being
certified, why should it be precluded from picketing to achieve volun-
tary recognition? Arguably, this case should not be governed by sec-
tion 8(b)(7), which places predominant emphasis on picketing in dero-
gation of employee free choice. 23 However, the contrary view is that
the statute's clear language prohibits recognitional picketing con-
ducted within a year of a Board election regardless of whether the
picketing union has won or lost the election. 237
The application of section 8(b)(7)(C) to the facts of St. Luke's is not
as clear. This section prohibits picketing conducted without the filing
232. Silverman v. Local No. 803, No. 83-2095, slip op. at 6. Since the statute does
not distinguish among elections on the basis of whether they are won or lost, the
union's argument would have required the ALJ to ignore the clear language of the
statute to find that picketing was only prohibited where the union lost the election.
St. Luke's, JD-115-83, at 3-4.
233. St. Luke's, JD-115-83, at 3-4. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
234. Id. at 7. The ALJ cited Dunbar and A-1 in support of his decision. Id. at 6.
235. Correspondence from Joseph E. Moore, Assoc. Executive Secretary of the
Board, March 9, 1984 (available in Fordham Law School Library).
236. Section 8(b)(7)(A) prohibits picketing where another union lawfully has been
recognized as the employees' representative. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). Section
8(b)(7)(B) prohibits picketing where a valid election has been conducted in the past
year. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976). A certifiable union has no need to picket after
winning a Board election, since the employer is obligated to recognize it. See supra
note 65. If the union is rejected by the employees in the election and it pickets to
obtain recognition, section 8(b)(7)(B) applies. LABOR LAW 1983, supra note 21, at
1091.
Finally, section 8(b)(7)(C) is directed at picketing that occurs without the filing of
a petition and provides for an expedited election to determine employee sentiment.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). As the Board stated in Blinne, -[b]y this device
machinery can quickly be set in motion to resolve by a free and fair election the
underlying question concerning representation out of which the picketing arises. This
is the normal situation, and the situation which the statute is basically designed to
serve." 135 N.L.R.B. at 1165. But the Board went on to hold that picketing for
recognition by a union that had demonstrated its majority status in an appropriate
unit was nonetheless unlawful under section 8(b)(7)(C) where the union had not filed
a timely petition. Id. at 1167.
237. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976); St. Luke's, JD-115-83 at 5.
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of a petition and provides for an expedited election to resolve the
question of whether the employees wish to be represented by the
union. 238 Until now, cases involving nonqualified unions have held
that, since the Board has discretion to refuse to conduct an election,
picketing by the union violates section 8(b)(7)(C), regardless of either
the duration of the picketing or whether a petition has been filed. 239
However, in no case before St. Luke's was the picketing preceded by a
Board election which was won by a nonqualified union.2 40 Thus, St.
Luke's does not seem to fit under prior section 8(b)(7)(C) case law.
The picketing was not conducted without the filing of a petition, as in
A-1, or in the face of the Board's refusal to conduct an election, as in
Dunbar. It is apparent that the drafters of section 8(b)(7) did not
consider how its provisions should be applied to noncertifiable un-
ions, 24' and it is even more apparent that they did not contemplate the
possible effect of a Bally's election. 242
The Board does not need to look further than the clear language of
section 8(b)(7)(B) to support affirmance of the judge's decision in St.
Luke's. 243 The case is significant because it illustrates the various
policies and interests that are involved in a Bally's election. In decid-
ing St. Luke's, Wells Fargo and Brink's, it is essential for the Board to
consider these policies and interests carefully and attempt to resolve
them within the language and intent of sections 9(b)(3), 8(a)(5) and
8(b)(7). Whatever results the Board reaches, it should provide a well
supported balancing of those interests.
VII. Analysis of Problems in Reconciling Section 9(b)(3) With the
Overall Policies of the Act
To obtain a consistent and proper rule for the application of section
9(b)(3), the Board must consider the overall policies of the Act. Specif-
ically, it must attempt to promote employee free choice and industrial
stability while adhering to the dictates of section 9(b)(3). The first
problem in applying the section arises from the fact that it uses the
238. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). See supra note 236.
239. A-1, 224 N.L.R.B. at 436.
240. In the proceeding to enjoin the threatened picketing at St. Luke's, the district
court judge acknowledged that the case presented "unusual facts." Silverman v.
Local No. 803, No. 83-2095, at 6.
241. Dunbar, 211 N.L.R.B. at 690, states: "it is quite possible that this rare
instance was one that was not foreseen by Congress."
242. The Board did not confront the question of allowing noncertifiable unions to
intervene and appear on the ballot until 1962 in Burns, 138 N.L.R.B. 449, three
years after the enactment of section 8(b)(7). See supra note 67.
243. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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term "guard" in a general manner, whereas the legislative history
primarily refers to "plant guards. 2 44 The argument has been made
that if Congress only intended to cover plant guards, application of
the provisions of section 9(b)(3) to contract guards, including armored
couriers, unlawfully limits their freedom to choose a union. 245
The second problem arises from the enigmatic language of section
9(b)(3), which fails to answer the question of whether a nonqualified
union's electoral participation is proper under any circumstances.
246
The arguments for and against the Bally's rule must be considered in
light of the realities of collective bargaining in the security industry.
The industry is highly competitive and non-union companies are a
major factor. 247 Collective bargaining in such a business climate is
difficult for any union. Some of the witnesses in the 1977 congressio-
nal hearings on amending the Act argued that the independent secur-
ity guard unions are not equal to this challenge and that large national
unions such as the Teamsters are more effective in bargaining for
security guards. 248 Although it would be difficult to prove that guard
unions are generally inferior to nonguard unions, it cannot be dis-
puted that a union with more members generally has more "clout" at
the bargaining table than does a union with a small membership. 249 In
consideration of this fact, guards should not be prevented from voting
for nonqualified unions where Congress merely intended to prevent
the Board from certifying nonqualified unions.
The major argument against the Bally's rule was expressed in
Wackenhut where the Board speculated that its election process could
be disrupted by allowing a nonqualified union to " 'jump' on the
ballot" with only one authorization card. 250 Wackenhut however,
incorrectly resolved this problem by limiting participation in the
Board's electoral process to an incumbent union.25 Wackenhut's ap-
244. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. Although many cases have
addressed this issue, its resolution is beyond the scope of this Note, and it is only one
of many factors which arguably create labor relations problems in the security
industry.
246. See supra Section IV.
247. Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 577 (remarks of Silvers).
248. See supra note 54, concerning testimony of Russell Silvers, President of
Brink's; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 569 (testimony of Executive Vice-
President of Wallace Security Agency, Inc., that guards should not be denied right to
be represented by "responsible union").
249. See supra note 54.
250. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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proach does not consider the possibility of substantial employee sup-
port for a nonqualified, nonincumbent union. The logical solution is
to find a middle ground between Bally's and Wackenhut by requiring
a greater showing of interest where a nonqualified union seeks to get
on the ballot in a Board election. 252 Such a union should be required to
produce the thirty percent showing of interest expected of the peti-
tioning union. This requirement would reduce the possibility that an
intervening union's showing of interest was collusively obtained in an
effort to totally deny employees their statutory right to union repre-
sentation .253
Another issue raised by the language of section 9(b)(3) is whether
the statute turns voluntary recognition of a nonqualified union into
"bargaining at will. '"254 Presently, there is no question that Congress
intended to allow voluntary recognition notwithstanding section
9(b)(3).255 When a bargaining order is issued under such circum-
stances, it does not violate section 9(b)(3), because the Board is not
certifying the union that has obtained the voluntary recognition.2 56 It
merely is noting that the parties voluntarily entered into a bargaining
relationship in an appropriate unit and acknowledging that the rela-
tionship should be preserved. Any other procedure would make the
employees' rights to meaningful representation by a nonqualified un-
ion contingent on the employer's consent and should not be allowed
by the Board.
The easiest issue to resolve is that of recognitional picketing. As
Dunbar notes, picketing for a one-man unit is distinguishable from
picketing by a nonqualified union seeking to represent guards.2 57 The
clear intent of section 8(b)(7) is to limit picketing that attempts to
subvert the Board's election processes, and Congress made no excep-
tion for guards under section 9(b)(3).2 58 By picketing for a guard unit,
a nonqualified union attempts to force the Board to conduct an elec-
tion in such a unit, depriving the Board of its discretion under the
Bally's rule and giving nonqualified unions greater rights than quali-
252. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 151.
254. See supra text accompanying note 203.
255. See MRA Assocs., Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 676 (1979). Also see supra notes 60-62
and accompanying text for a discussion of cases where voluntary recognition had
been extended.
256. See supra notes 69 & 141 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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fied ones. 25 The case law proscribes recognitional picketing notwith-
standing section 9(b)(3). 260 The Board should continue to follow this
approach.
VIII. Recommendations for a More Coherent Future Approach
The Board should modify the Bally's rule slightly by requiring a
thirty percent showing of interest by nonqualified unions which seek
to intervene. 26 This modification would assure proper use of the
Board's election machinery while leaving that machinery available to
vindicate employee free choice.
The Board should affirm the ALJ's Wells Fargo decision. 26 2 It
would be inconsistent to continue to hold voluntary recognition of
nonqualified unions permissible while allowing employers to end the
bargaining relationship unilaterally. Such a concept is foreign to the
Act, and its possible expansion into other areas would confuse Board
precedent, which presently requires an employer to continue to bar-
gain in the absence of a good-faith doubt of the union's majority
status. 2 3 If Congress intends to proscribe voluntary recognition, it
should do so through legislation. In the absence of congressional
action, the Board should continue to enforce bargaining relationships
that are entered into voluntarily by unions and employers.
Finally, the Board should not create a section 8(b)(7) exception for
guards. 26 4 Allowing recognitional picketing by a nonqualified union
that wins a Bally's election gives it a weapon more powerful than a
Board certification. 2 5 Unions that win Bally's elections should be
limited to using lawful means of economic pressure against employers.
IX. Conclusion
Section 9(b)(3) was intended by Congress to narrowly limit the
Board's certification powers. 2 6 It was not intended to deprive guards
of the opportunity to vote for nonqualified unions2 7 and it makes no
259. See supra note 223.
260. See supra Section VI.
261. See supra notes 152 & 252 and accompanying text.
262. See discussion of decision, supra at notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
263. See discussion of the Board's present practice in this regard, supra at notes
186 & 203 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 223.
266. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
267. See discussion, supra at Section IV.
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exception for recognitional picketing by nonqualified unions. 26 8 While
it allows voluntary recognition of nonqualified unions, it does not
prescribe any special rules concerning withdrawal of such recogni-
tion.26 9 The Board must, therefore, carefully balance the interests of
the employees, the union, the employer and the public and arrive at a
consistent rationale to apply to guard cases.
270
The proposed approach27' is consistent with congressional intent
because it considers industrial stability and employee free choice while
staying within the limits Congress mandated in section 9(b)(3). The
employees can express their preference for a nonqualified union in a
Bally's election. The employer can refuse to voluntarily recognize a
nonqualified union, subject to the employees' right to strike. How-
ever, once voluntary recognition is extended, the employer must pos-
sess a good-faith doubt of the union's majority status to end the
relationship. Finally, a nonqualified union does not obtain greater
rights than other unions to engage in recognitional picketing in cases
where the Board is prohibited from certifying the nonqualified union,
or refuses to conduct an election. The Board should adopt this pro-
posed approach.
Vivian A. Rattay
268. See discussion, supra at Section VI.
269. See discussion, supra at Section V.
270. See analysis, supra at Section VII.
271. See recommendations, supra at Section VIII.
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